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EFFECTIVE REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS:
PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES AND PROPOSALS
CLYDE SUMMERSt
Labor lawyers and scholars have become increasingly aware
during the last dozen years of a broad, long-term trend toward
greater legal protection of the individual employee in the employ-
ment relation. This awareness was triggered in part by the dramatic
change in judicial attitudes toward employment at will. Led by
courts in California,1 Connecticut,2 Michigan,3 and New Hamp-
shire,4 the courts in a majority of states5 have repudiated the
misconceived dogma that an employee hired for an indefinite term
can be discharged "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong."6 Thoughtless repetition and brutal application of
this wooden rule has been replaced by the use of generally accepted
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1 See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 (Cal. 1980) (holding
that a tort claim is available for wrongful discharge); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that "in many different contexts,
there are practical, legally recognized limitations on that right to discharge at-will
employees"); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396,344 P.2d 25,
27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that considerations of public policy may create
an employee claim of wrongful discharge).
2 See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980)
(holding that a cause of action in tort arises from a wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy).
3 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 890 (Mich. 1980)
(holding that an employee may maintain an action for wrongful discharge where the
employer violates its own policy to terminate only for good or just cause).
4 See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (holding that
bad faith termination by the employer constitutes breach of the employment
contract).
5 Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have recognized a cause of action
in employment at will cases based on violations of public policy. Thirty-three states
and the District of Columbia have made available a wrongful discharge action based
upon contract theory where an employer has violated its policies, handbooks, or other
representations. See [9A Individual Employment Rights Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) pt. 505: 51-52 (July 1992) [hereinafter Indiv. Empl. Rts. Manual]. But see id.
(showing that only 15 states recognize a cause of action for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in employment at will cases).
6 Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507,519-20 (1884), rev'd on othergrounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 (1915).
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principles of contract and tort, which are rooted in fundamental
legal policies such as the binding obligation of representations,
7
good faith and fair dealing,8 promotion of public policies,9 and
protection against abusive action.
10
The trend did not begin with the employment at will cases but
can be traced back at least to the Equal Pay Act of 1963,1 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),1 2 the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)13 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 6f 1967 (ADEA).14 Other acts building upon this
statutory trend included the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSH), i5 and the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA). 16  Moreover, even before the judicial sea
change in employment at will, there was a number of little noted
federal provisions protecting employees who reported violations of
various statutes from discrimination in employment.
17
7 SeeJ. Peter Shapiro &James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security,
26 STAN. L. REV. 335,337 (1974) (arguing that the common law principles of implied
contract theory can be used to "safeguard legitimate employee interests against firing
without cause"); Clare Tully, Note, ChallengingtheEmployment-at-WillDoctrine Through
Modem Contract Theoty, 16 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 449,450 (1983) (arguing for an implied
contract theory that "both satisfies contractual requirements and protects the...
expectations of employees").
8 See Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1844 (1980) ("The courts should
imply a contract term allowing only good faith discharges, or create a tort duty that
employers discharge only in good faith.").
9 See Note, ProtectingEmployees at WillAgainst WrongulDischarge: ThePublicPolicy
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1951 (1983) (arguing that the public policy
exception should be expanded to protect employees from wrongful discharge).
1 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1421-27 (1967)
(arguing that the law of torts provides an appropriate judicial means of protecting
employees from abusive termination). For a discussion of the use of these common
law principles generally, see Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage:
Understanding the Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719
(1991); for a canvas of their application, see 2 HOWARD A. SPECTER & MATTHEW W.
FINKIN, INDrvIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 15.01-.23 (1989).
11 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
13 Id. § 2000e(k).
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
15 Id. §§ 651-678.
16 Id. §§ 1001-1461.
17 See WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION:
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 256-58, app. at 425-29 (1985) (citing various federal
"antiretaliation statutes," including the Asbestos School Hazard Detection & Control
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (1988), the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1293(a) (1988), and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(1)
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The trend towards greater legal protection continues with a
number of states enacting various types of "whistleblower" stat-
utes,18 and Montana enacting a general statute protecting against
unjust discharge. 19 In addition, state laws prohibit the use of
polygraphs, limit drug testing, permit employee access to personnel
files, protect the confidentiality of employee records, require
employers to provide nonsmoking work areas, 20 protect employees
from discharge because of garnishment,21 and require employers
to notify employees of the presence of toxic chemicals.22 As some
states experiment with such statutes, pressures for more comprehen-
sive and effective federal statutes mount. At the federal level,
Congress in 1988 enacted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN), 23 and in 1990 passed legislation prohib-
iting discrimination against the disabled, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).24 Pregnancy leave proposals are on the
immediate agenda,25 and a wide range of other statutes are on the
horizon.
The trend toward greater judicial and legislative protection has
deep roots in the failure of collective bargaining to provide
protection through the contractual process. One of the premises of
(1988)); 1 SPECTOR & FINKIN, supra note 10, § 10.02 (stating that the National Labor
Relations Board held that "an employee's ... efforts ... to enforce statutory
provisions ... constitute[] protected ... activity").
18 See STEPHEN M. KOHN & MICHAEL D. KOHN, THE LABOR LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS 17-72, 91-101
(1988) (discussing federal and state protection for employee whistleblowers and
describing the scope of protected activity); Terry M. Dworkin & Janet P. Near,
WhistleblowingStatutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241,242 n.4 (1987) (citing
statutes from California, Connecticut, Maine, Michigan, NewJersey, and New York).
19 See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Indiv. Empl. Rts. Manual, supra note 5, pts. 541-592, at 541:3, 545:31,
552:5, 556:15, 579:2 (citing a number of state statutes protecting individual
employees).
21 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2929(b) (West 1989) (providing that no employer
may discharge an employee by reason of the fact that her wages have been threatened
to be garnished or subject to garnishment).
2 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.068(b) (1991) (requiring employer whose employees
may be exposed to hazardous substances in the workplace to give various forms of
notice).
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988) (requiring employers with more than 100 full
time workers to give notice before plant closings and mass layoffs).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. II 1990).
2 The Family Medical Leave Act was passed by Congress in 1990, but vetoed by
President Bush. See Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Family Leave Bill, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 1992, at A9. A substantially similar bill is presently being considered in
Congress. See id.
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the Wagner Act2 6 was that collective bargaining would equalize
bargaining power sufficiently to enable employees to protect their
interests through collective agreements without the aid of legislation
prescribing terms of the employment relation. Collective bargain-
ing, where it became established, proved itself capable of perform-
ing this function. It became apparent, however, after forty years of
labor relations under the National Labor Relations Act that
employer resistance to the establishment of collective bargaining
had prevented it from serving this social purpose for the great
majority of employees. Thus courts and legislatures have felt the
pressure to fashion legal protection where collective agreements do
not provide it. The prospect is that this pressure and the trend will
continue.
27
Primary attention, as this trend developed, has inevitably
focused on what substantive employment rights should be legally
recognized and enforced. The debate at present is focused on what
protection employees should have against unjust discharge; what
protections employees should have against invasions of privacy;
what protections employees should have when plants close; what
toxic substances should be prohibited in the workplace; what, if any,
notice should employees have of other toxic substances to which
they are exposed; when should drug tests be allowed; and what
medical insurance should an employer be required to provide.
A secondary but significant question, which has received less
attention, addresses what kinds of procedures and remedies should
be provided to enforce those rights. 28 The truism that there is no
right without a remedy can be more usefully stated in the form that
the reality of the right depends on the effectiveness of the remedy.
My purpose here is to pass over the substantive debate and, in a
preliminary fashion, inquire how the procedures and remedies for
enforcing individual employment rights might best be designed. We
have now had substantial experience with enforcing a variety of
those rights. It will be useful to examine some of the procedures
and remedies used in enforcing these rights to learn the lessons
which they may offer as to their effectiveness. We may be able to
26 49 Stat. 372 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
27 See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 16-17 (1988) (arguing that passage of recent protections
creates a multiplier effect, generating demand to protect additional employee rights).
28 For a comprehensive discussion of the potentials and problems of unions
enforcing these rights, see Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based
Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 169 (1991).
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identify some preliminary guidelines for restructuring the proce-
dures and remedies enforcing existing rights, and for establishing
more effective enforcement processes for future rights.
There is no intent or expectation that a single procedure and
remedy can be designed for all individual employment rights.
Procedures and remedies must be tailored to fit the shape of the
substantive right. However, certain factors common to most or all
employment relations raise common considerations in evaluating
and designing remedies. First, the employment relation is a
dominant-servient relation, and any effort by an employee to
enforce rights against the employer functions in a context of
inequality of both power and resources. Second, individual
employees acting to enforce their rights are likely to be first-time
players, with no expectation of becoming a repeat player. The
employer, on the other hand, will be or expect to be, a repeat
player. This increases the employer's advantage both in experience
and incentive to deploy resources in the contest. Third, legal
protection of any employment right is potentially applicable to
millions of employees in hundreds of thousands of workplaces, and
this may generate thousands or even millions of claims requiring
mass administration of justice. These and other common factors
should lead to some common guidelines for enforcement of various
employment rights, although the rights to be enforced may be quite
diverse.
My purpose here is to describe briefly the different procedures
and remedies used for protecting certain individual employment
rights, and to evaluate each in a preliminary fashion for its effective-
ness in protecting those rights. Examination will be limited to
remedies for various forms of wrongful dismissal under the
common law, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, for underpayment of wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, for violation of health and safety standards under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and for injuries on the job.
These involve different types of employment rights-the right to job
security, the right to minimum wages, the right to physical integrity,
and the right to compensation for work injuries. By examining
enforcement of this range of employment rights, it may be possible
to draw some tentative guidelines which might have general
applicability toward designing procedures and remedies for present
and future employment rights. Beyond these tentative guidelines,
I will suggest some structural proposals for enforcement of
employment rights generally.
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The analysis and evaluation here can be no more than prelimi-
nary, for few empirical studies have been made of the effectiveness
of any of these procedures and remedies. The best that can be
done for now is to draw on incomplete data, random facts,
anecdotal evidence, and impressionistic experience of how various
procedures and remedies work. Detailed studies might disclose
different strengths and weaknesses than those projected. It should
be useful, however, to develop at least a preliminary framework of
analysis and offer some tentative conclusions which might be more
critically examined by empirical studies and further consideration.
I. REMEDIES FOR RIGHTS TO JOB SECURITY
Job security is a primary area of individual employment rights.
It includes the currently volatile field of employment-at-will;
discrimination because of union membership, race, sex, age and
handicap; polygraph and drug testing; parental leave and plant
closing, as well as seniority rights and discipline for cause under
collective agreements. The focus here is limited to three major
procedures and remedies presently available.
A. Common Law Remedies
An appropriate place to start our inquiry is with the common
law remedies for wrongful dismissal, where courts have developed
exceptions to employment at will. In principle, the remedy depends
on the legal theory used to uphold the employee's claim. If the
dismissal is found to violate the contract of employment implied
from provisions in an employee handbook, representations made at
the time of hiring, or other implied or express promises, then the
remedies are limited to those traditionally available for breach of
contract. If, on the other hand, the dismissal is found to be
violative of public policy, retaliatory, malicious, or abusive, the
remedies extend to those traditionally available in tort. In practice,
the lines are not always so neatly drawn. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 29 the court stated that the termination was wrongful if "moti-
vated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation," but limited
damages to loss of back pay. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,3
0
the court invoked the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
2 316 A.2d 549,551-52 (N.H. 1974).
30 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728-29 (Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958)).
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"[which] is ... implied in every contract," but held that the dis-
missed employee might recover punitive damages.
When the court treats the dismissal as a breach of the employ-
ment contract, damages are customarily limited to loss of earnings
and pension rights. This may include loss of future earnings,
although due to the difficulty in determining these, they may be
excluded or conservatively estimated. Furthermore, discharged
employees are not ordered reinstated in their jobs, because the
courts mechanically follow the outdated aphorism that equity will
not order specific performance of a personal service contract.
3 1
Additionally, damages for disruption of personal life, emotional
distress and other consequential injuries are seldom included, and
punitive damages are rarely allowed in breach of contract cases.
3 2
In real terms, employees are seldom made whole, even for all
economic loss. Damages in contract are substantial only when the
discharged employee is in the upper salary brackets. Thus, in
Monge, the damages recovered by a wrongfully discharged hourly
wage worker were only approximately $1500; s3 but in Toussaint v.
Blue Cross &Blue Shield, a middle management employee recovered
approximately $73,000.3
4
When the court treats the dismissal as a tort, the damages may
be many times greater, for they may include, in addition to
economic loss, damages for emotional distress and punitive
damages. In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co., the Montana
Supreme Court found a violation of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and upheld an award of $1891 compensatory damages
and $50,000 punitive damages.3 5 In another case, the same court
upheld an award of $94,170 for economic damages, $100,000 for
31 See 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964); see also
Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 28-40 (noting the limitations of the reinstatement remedy).
32 Most states treat the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as grounded in
contract. Some states, however, treat it as a tort, entitling the plaintiff to emotional
distress and punitive damages. See 1 SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 10, § 10.52; 2
SPECTER & FINKiN, supra note 10, § 15.11; see also Michael H. Cohen, Comment,
Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing As A Tort,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1291, 1291 (1985) ("Tort victims may recover all consequential
damages flowing from the wrongful act. Parties injured in contract, on the other
hand, face several obstacles to full recovery.").
33 Monge, 316 A.2d at 552.
34 292 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Mich. 1980). In a companion case, Eblingv. Masco Corp.,
the plaintiff recovered $300,000 because the discharge left him ineligible to exercise
a stock option. Id. at 897 n.39.
35 See 668 P.2d 213, 214, 216 (Mont. 1983).
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emotional distress and $1,300,000 in punitive damages.3 6  In
California, where violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was, until 1988, treated as a tort,3 7 there were numerous
multi-million dollar verdicts. A study by the Rand Institute for Civil
Justice of 120 cases which went to jury verdicts between 1980 and
1986 found the average verdict for winning plaintiffs to be nearly
$650,000,38 with the ten highest verdicts averaging nearly $4
million.
3 9
These numbers provide a highly misleading picture of the
remedies obtained by wrongfully discharged employees. First, the
average is distorted by the few multi-million dollar verdicts. The
Rand Study showed a median verdict of approximately $177,000.40
Second, post-trial appeals and settlements substantially reduce the
final payments. The median award is reduced by approximately
23%,41 making the median final payment for those who win about
$136,000.42 Third, lawyers' contingency fees of 40%, and out of
pocket expenses of 5% to 10% routinely absorb approximately
45%43 of the final payment, leaving the net median recovery of
wrongfully discharged employees who win jury verdicts at about
$74,500.
44
More marked and more significant is the disparity in recovery
36 See Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257, 258 (Mont.
1986).
37 In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 395 (Cal. 1988), the California
Supreme Court held that tort remedies would not be extended to breach of the
implied covenant of good faith in wrongful discharge cases. Recovery would be
limited to contractual damage. Id. at 401.
38 SeeJAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 44 (1988) [hereinafter THE RAND STUDY]. A larger study,
based on 223 cases in California, found a substantially lower average jury verdict of
$486,812. DavidJ.Jung & Richard Harkness, The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, 4 LAB.
LAW. 257, 259, 260 (1988) [hereinafter The Facts].
39 THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 26-27.
40 Id. at 26 (noting that one-half of the awards were smaller than the cited figure).
The study by Jung and Harkness shows a lower median verdict of approximately
$124,000. The Facts, supra note 38, at 260.
41 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 35 (given that the payout ratios for the
second and third quartiles are .79 and .75 respectively).
42 See id. (applying the 23% reduction to the $177,000 median figure).
13 Id. at 37 (noting that over 50% of attorneys charged a flat 40% fee, whereas
about 10% charged over 40%).
44 Id. at 39. This net median recovery, based on the Rand Study, is probably high.
Jung and Harkness found a median award of about $124,000. The Facts, supra note
38, at 260. With a reduction of 23% for post-trial appeals and settlements as derived
from the Rand Study, the median final payment by an employer would be about
$95,000, and after payment of lawyer fees and costs of 45% would be about $51,000.
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among winning plaintiffs. The individuals in the lowest quartile of
winning plaintiffs end up with net payments of less than $25,000,
while those in the highest quartile end up with net payments of
approximately $550,000. 45 Plaintiffs in the top ten cases netted
payments of more than $900,000.46
Whereas the figures cited in the previous paragraph refer to
recoveries obtained by those discharged employees who win jury
verdicts, more than a third of those who end up in court lose on
preliminary motions before getting to the jury,47 and about a third
of those who do get to the jury do not win a verdict.48 The net
result is that more than half of those discharged employees whose
cases are judicially resolved obtain nothing. This situation prevailed
in California, at a time when California was considered the Eden for
discharged employees, both in terms of substantive legal rules
protecting employees and the generosity of its damage awards. It
is generally accepted that discharged employees in other states win
much less frequently, and those who win obtain much smaller
recoveries.
Most cases, of course, do not end up in court. Rather, they are
settled prior to adjudication. One survey estimated that 95% of the
cases are settled,49 but anecdotal evidence suggests that the
settlement rate may be substantially smaller in other states. No
hard data exist as to settlement amounts, nor at what point cases are
settled. Some data and anecdotal evidence indicate that employers
substantially undervalue cases, especially during a period when
recoveries are becoming more frequent and awards are escalat-
ing.5° Even plaintiffs seem to undervalue cases where large awards
are conceivable. Overall, plaintiffs probably recover substantially
less than half as much if the case is settled than if it goes to court
and is won.
51
45 THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 41.
46 See id. at 41.
47 This estimate is based onJung and Harkness's data on the percentage ofjury
verdicts won and an estimate of cases in which plaintiffs who go to court ultimately
prevail. See The Facts, supra note 38, at 260 (noting that plaintiffs win 70% of jury
trials, and 45% of all cases judicially resolved).
48 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 25 (32.5%); The Facts at 260 (30%).
49 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 48.
50 See generally id. at 41-43 (noting that for the largest awards, "defendants could
have reduced their payments by an average of over two-thirds by agreeing to meet
plaintiff demands").
-' A mail survey of lawyers involved in settlements indicated that 95% of all
wrongful termination cases are settled for amounts averaging $30,000. Id. at 48. In
1992]
466 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:457
Two stark facts emerge from these data. First, most wrongfully
discharged employees obtained modest or wholly inadequate
awards, even in California, where the substantive legal rules made
tort remedies available in most cases. The majority of plaintiffs are
executives or middle management employees, with average salaries,
in the early 1980s, of $36,000.52 A recovery of $74,500, 53 which
in most cases includes damages for emotional distress and punitive
damages, amounts to only two years' lost salary. If the suit is in
contract, the award is only for loss of earnings. After payment of
legal costs, the wrongfully discharged employee recovers only a little
more than one-half of her direct economic loss. This recovery
typically comes three to five years after the discharge, with no
interest on the lost earnings.
Second, there is a wide disparity in the amount recovered by
discharged employees, which often bears little relation to economic
loss. The amount of recovery depends largely on the amount
awarded for emotional distress and punitive damages.54 These
awards may range from double to twenty times the economic
loss. 55 Bringing suit for wrongful discharge, even in a state as
favorable as California before 1988, is a lottery in which many
receive nothing, most receive less than their economic loss, while a
lucky few win the jackpot.
A significant consideration in measuring the effectiveness of
remedies is the high cost of litigation. Plaintiff lawyers' fees, based
on a 40% contingency fee,56 would average more than $119,000
for cases won at trial and approximately $80,000 for all cases
tried.57 Plaintiff lawyers, however, are engaged in the same lottery
as the discharged employees. For cases in the lowest quartile, the
average fee will be only $14,000 for cases won at trial. 58 Even in
the median winning case, though the fee may be as high as
$54,000,59 one-third of the cases tried by a jury are lost.60 Cases
contrast, the average jury award, excluding defensejudgments, but including punitive
damages, was $646,855. Id. at 25.
52 See id. at 20-21.
53 See sipra note 44.
54 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 25; The Facts, supra note 38 at 264-65.
55 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
r Se4 e.g., THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 41 (stating that the contingency
fees in the studied cases were between 37%-39%).
57 See id. at 40. In measuring legal fees, the relevant amount is the average
recovery, not the median recovery.
58 See id. at 41.
59 Seesupra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. A 40% contingency fee is applied
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in the highest quartile, however, produce an average fee of
$354,000, and the ten highest cases produced an average fee of
$561,000.61
High litigation costs undercut the usefulness of the remedy for
many discharged employees. Although no systematic data are
available on the legal costs of bringing a case to trial, plaintiff
lawyers have stated that their costs, including their time, range from
$5000 to $25,000, and that there is seldom serious effort made to
settle much before trial.62 Trying the case similarly may add
another $5000 to $25,000.63 Where recovery is limited to contract
damages, prospective litigation costs may easily exceed potential
recovery, except for high salaried employees. Therefore, even if the
dismissal is clearly wrongful and success in litigation certain, the
lawyer may not be able to afford to take the case on contingency, if
the employer is likely to force the case to trial. If suit can be
brought in tort, with lost earnings embellished by emotional distress
and punitive damages, recovery must be above $60,000 to support
the costs of litigation, particularly if the employer escalates those
costs with extensive discovery, interrogatories, depositions, and
preliminary motions.6 4 Where the prospect of victory is uncertain,
as it is in most cases, a lawyer will be unwilling to take the case on
a straight contingency basis unless there is the prospect of an early
settlement or recovery substantially above the median to appeal to
the lawyer's gambling instincts.
Because of litigation costs, all but middle and upper income
employees are largely foreclosed from any access to a remedy for
wrongful dismissal. This is apparent from the reported cases.
Relatively few plaintiffs are hourly wage or clerical workers; the
large majority are professional employees or are in middle and
upper management.65 Middle income employees with contract
to the $136,000 median award.
60 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 25.
61.See id. at 41. These figures give an inaccurate impression of the plaintiff
lawyer's income, for although two-thirds of the cases brought to trial are won, only
half the cases not settled but judicially resolved are won. For all cases judicially
resolved, the plaintiff's lawyer can therefore expect an average fee of $60,000, while
the average fee is $7000 for cases in the lowest quartile and $176,000 for cases in the
upper quartile. Id.
62 These figures are based on estimates derived from numerous conversations I
have had with practitioners over the past few years.
63 See supra note 62.
64 See supra note 62.
65 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 21.
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claims or modest tort claims who cannot make a substantial
payment in advance will be discouraged by lawyers from pursuing
their claims. Lower income employees without substantial tort
claims will have difficulty finding a lawyer.
66
The consequences of high litigation costs for employers are
different, but no less troublesome. When an employee makes a
claim of wrongful discharge, the employer must either make an
early settlement, regardless of the merits of the claim, or face the
immediate prospect of heavy legal costs. The Rand Study found that
pre-trial defense legal fees averaged $25,00067 and for cases going
to trial the defense legal fees averaged approximately $80,000.68
The defense fees, usually billed at an hourly rate, are substantially
the same whether the case is won or lost.
In California, it is claimed that many questionable wrongful
discharge suits are threatened or brought in the hopes that the
employer will settle to avoid these costs. This pressure continues,
for if the case is not settled and is brought to trial, the legal fees for
each case on average cost the employer $80,000,69 with median
legal costs of $65,000.70 Because the employer wins only one-third
of the cases which go to trial, the cost of legal fees for all cases at
the median which the employer wins becomes $195,000, more than
the final estimated payment in the median case of $136,000.71
From this perspective it would benefit the employer in most cases
to settle rather than to contest the cases, 72 and some employers do
follow this principle. This, however, invites more questionable
claims. Furthermore, the employer knows that in most cases the
discharged employee cannot afford to pursue his suit or obtain a
lawyer who will take the case on a contingency basis. By vigorously
contesting every case, an employer can gain a reputation which will
discourage or foreclose employees, even employees with good
6 In my conversations with them, lawyers experienced in handling wrongful
discharge cases have explained that if the potential claim is less than $25,000, they
will not take the case, or at most will attempt to negotiate a settlement.
6 7 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 48.
68 See id. at 37. Where recovery is in the lowest quartile-below $25,000-defense
legal costs average $51,000; where recovery is in the upper quartile-approximately
$560,000-defense legal fees average $111,000. Id. at 41.
69 Id. at 37.
70 Id. at 38.
71 See supra notes 42 & 60 and accompanying text.
72 See THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 42, 45 (noting that in 20% of all cases,
legal fees exceed the offer to settle, and that "[c]onsidering legal fees, most
defendants would be better paying the demands rather than going to trial").
I
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claims, from bringing suit. There seems to be an increasing number
of employers following this strategy, except perhaps in cases where
the discharge was so clearly wrongful that liability is beyond doubt.
The consequence of this strategy is effectively to deny remedies to
many employees who were, in fact, wrongfully discharged.
The high costs of litigation in these cases raise a serious social
question concerning transaction costs. In the median case, the
wrongfully discharged employee ends up with a net payment of less
than $74,500. 73 For every wronged employee thus compensated,
the employer pays legal fees of one and a half the estimated median
fee, or about $97,500,74 and the plaintiff's lawyer obtains
$54,000, 7' for a total of about $151,500 in fees. To this figure,
one must add court and out of pocket costs to both sides of
approximately $10,000.76 In short, more than $160,000 may be
spent to transfer less than $74,500 of compensation to a wronged
employee. This entire cost is ultimately borne by the employer
while the wronged employee goes undercompensated. This is
scarcely a legal remedy process but rather a redistribution device
which enriches lawyers at the expense of both the employer and the
employee.
An important measure of a remedy is its effectiveness in
deterring conduct which the law considers wrongful. Large jury
verdicts, particularly when widely publicized,, certainly serve the
useful purpose of deterring some employers from discharging
employees except for good and demonstrable cause. Even though
the large verdicts are few and random, their notoriety gives them
substantial impact.77  Many companies have improved their
internal procedures and monitor discharges more carefully, with a
few having established binding arbitration for non-union employ-
ees.78 However, the dominant employer response, motivated or
73 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
74 THE RAND STUDY, supra note 38, at 40; see also supra note 60.
7- See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
76 This figure represents an estimate based on conversations I have had with
practitioners.
7 See Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: 'Dagwood" and Goliath, 62
MicH. Bus. LJ. 776, 776 (1983) (citing a study by a San Francisco law firm showing
that 90% of wrongful dismissal suits resulted in plaintiff verdicts averaging $450,000);
Jeff B. Copeland, The Revenge of the Fired, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1987, at 46, 47
(reporting that 72% of employees who sued their bosses for being fired recovered an
average of $582,000).
78 Among major companies providing binding arbitration for non-union
employees are Montgomery Ward, Duke University, Gannett Corporation, and Meijer,
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encouraged by lawyers and employment consultants, is not so much
to avoid unjust discharges, but to suit up in "legal armorplate" to
defend against judicial exceptions to employment at will. 79 Most
of this legal advice emphasizes writing explicit "at will" clauses into
all hiring documents and contracts, purging handbooks of all
references to job security, and instructing supervisors not to make
any representation as to how long a job may last or how long the
employee will be kept. The focus is almost entirely on the employ-
ment contract, and protects only against contract actions in which
damages are limited to lost earnings. This touted "armorplate"
gives little or no protection against tort actions with their added
liability for emotional distress and punitive damages.80 It may
create risks by giving supervisors a false sense of security that they
can discharge any employee at any time for any reason.
The notoriety of large jury verdicts, while deterring some
employers from unjustified dismissals, incites discharged employees
and their lawyers to bring suit even though their cases have little
merit.81 If the case is one which may stir the judge or jury, they
are encouraged to gamble, hoping that legal action will produce a
Inc. See Thomas J. Barnes &Jeffrey S. Rueble, Making Wrongful Discharge Right, 66
MICH. B.J. 128 (1987). Other companies adopting similar procedures include Trans
World Airlines, American Optical Company, Polaroid, and Pittsburgh Plate Glass, see
Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a
Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319, 326 (1983), as well as Ohio Power
Company, Kraft, Inc., and Northrup Corporation, see Edward B. Shils, A Review of
Possible Alternatives to Eliminate the "Employment.at-Will"Doctrine with Special Emphasis
on the Growing Field of Voluntaty Arbitration 54-58, 67-72, 84-87 (Apr. 30, 1986)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
.9 See generally Bennett W. Root,Jr., Defending Against Wrongful Termination Before
and After Litigation, in EMPLOYEE TERMINATION HANDBOOK 61-89 (Jeffrey G. Allen ed.,
1986) (discussing steps employers can take to minimize wrongful discharge litigation);
Richard G. Moon, AvoidingLiability for Wrongful Discharge-Management Planning and
Litigation Tactics, 62 MICH. BJ. 780 (1983) (discussing both pre-litigation efforts and
litigation techniques used to avoid liability for discharging employees); Alan F.
Westin, Employer Responses to New Judicial Rulings on At-Will Employment: A Warning
About the "Legal Armorplate" Approach, 36 PROC. N.Y.U. ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB.
13-1 (1983) (discussing how the "legal armorplate" approach is bad from both the
labor relations and legal strategy viewpoints).
80 SeeJulius M. Steiner & Allen M. Dabrow, The Questionable Value of the Inclusion
of Language Confirming Employment-at-Will Status in Company Personnel Documents, 37
LAB. LJ. 639, 642 (1986); Patricia M. Lenard, Note, Unjust Dismissal of Employees At
Will: Are Disclaimers a Final Solution?, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 562 (1987). See
generally Westin, supra note 79, at 13-21 to 13-23 (discussing why the "legal
armorplate" approach is bad legal strategy).
81 See Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.
L. REV. 631, 684 (1988).
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silk purse full of gold from a sow's ear.
One of the less visible contributions of common law remedies
for wrongful dismissal, and particularly tort liability with its
potentially massive judgments, has been to reduce employer
opposition to legislation providing broader protection against unjust
discharge with remedies limited to economic loss. Without the
threat of tort liability, employers' opposition to any legislation
providing general protection has been, and would continue to be,
adamant. It is no accident that the states in which such proposals
have been taken seriously are ones in which the courts have upheld
large awards. Indeed, the Montana statute which prohibits
discharge without "just cause" was a reaction to court decisions
which caused employers to prefer legislation to living under the
Sword of Damocles of massive tort liability.8 2 At the same time,
the reality of large recoveries creates a counterforce resisting
legislation which broadens protection while limiting damages to
economic loss. In California, where plaintiffs have won large
awards, determined opposition to legislation has come from the
plaintiff's bar, which profits from litigation-particularly from large
recoveries for emotional distress and punitive damages.
83
No studies comparable to those made in California have been
made in other states, but the pattern appears substantially the same,
82 See generally id. at 663-71 (outlining the Montana statute and discussing the
Montana Supreme Court termination decisions that preceded it);Jonathan Tompkins,
Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana's Wrongful-Discharge Law, 14
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 387, 392 (1988) (discussing the political environment in which
Montana's wrongful discharge legislation was drafted). The political reaction in
California took a different turn. The notoriety of large tort verdicts helped fuel the
move to remove, by referendum, members of the California Supreme Court seen as
responsible for the decisions which led to the large verdicts; three judges were
removed. See Arbitration Holds Promise for Employers Who Want to Stem Wrongful
Discharge Suits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 219, at A-5 (Nov. 13, 1986), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (noting that the denial of reconfirmation by voters
of ChiefJustice Rose Elizabeth Bird and associate justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz
Reynoso could have an impact on future wrongful discharge awards). Their newly
appointed replacements promptly eliminated the common law tort remedies for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, reasoning that in the
employment relationship the covenant was fundamentally contractual. See Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 n.42 (Cal. 1988) (disapproving previous
appellate cases permitting causes of action in tort for breach of the implied covenant).
83 See generally William B. Gould, IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case
for Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 405-06, 414-15 (1987) (citing examples of
large jury verdicts for California plaintiffs, and explaining that lawyers who represent
these employees would not embrace arbitration as an alternative to the existing
system).
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with the exception that in other states plaintiffs win less often. Jury
verdicts may be smaller in other states, but the Montana experience
suggests that multi-million dollar verdicts are not the product of
California sun or soft-headedness.
Common law remedies for wrongful discharge, however
"wrongful" is substantively defined, have little to commend them.
The limited in terrorem effect of large verdicts and potential legal
costs may induce some employers to change their internal proce-
dures or to be more circumspect in dismissing employees, but other
employers try to shield themselves with "legal armorplate" and
contest every lawsuit, no matter how legitimate the claim. Most
wrongfully discharged employees who win in court, however, are
under-compensated for their economic loss, even when they recover
punitive damages. Where recovery is only in contract, they at best
end up with little more than half their lost earnings. Employees
whose potential recovery is not large have difficulty finding a lawyer
on a contingency basis. Likewise, most lack the resources to pay
hourly rates and legal costs in advance. In states where employees
win less often than in California, legal costs cause most wrongful
discharges to go unremedied. For employers, the legal costs in the
majority of contested cases are as much as or more than the award
paid over to the winning plaintiffs and their lawyers. The result is
that in most cases the total legal cost of litigating these claims is
four or five times the amount received by the wronged employee.
Except from the narrow perception of the legal profession, this is
gross social wastage.
B. National Labor Relations Act Remedies
Remedies for the individual employee under the National Labor
Relations Act8 4 provide a sharp contrast to common law remedies.
In the abstract, the procedures and remedies seem nearly ideal from
the standpoint of an employee who suffers employment discrimina-
tion due to union activity.
85
An employee who believes she is wronged needs simply to file
a charge with the Regional Office of the National Labor Relations
Board. She incurs no legal costs because the General Counsel acts
84 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
' Over one half of the charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board
against employers are for illegal discharge or other discrimination against employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(3). See 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 6 (1990).
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as investigator, conciliator and prosecutor. If the Board finds a
violation, the General Counsel handles all appeals, even to the
Supreme Court. 6 The standard remedy for a discharged employ-
ee is reinstatement with back pay, compensating her for all loss of
earnings.8
7
The administrative process is designed not to discourage
employees who feel wronged from seeking help, but to weed out
worthless cases at an early stage, simplify procedures, and minimize
legal costs. Separate datum is not available on how many dis-
charged employees go to the Board for help, but less than 6% of all
inquiries in the Regional Offices result in charges being filed.88
When a charge is filed, the Regional Office investigates to deter-
mine the merits of the charge. After investigation, nearly two-thirds
of all charges against employers are either withdrawn by the
charging party or dismissed by the Regional Director as lacking
merit.8 9 If the case has merit the Regional Office then attempts
to conciliate or settle the remaining cases before issuing a com-
plaint.90 The end result is that nearly 87% of all charges against
employers are disposed of before a complaint is issued.91 This
disposition is accomplished within a median time of forty-five days
after the filing of the charge.92 Efforts to settle continue after the
complaint is issued so that only 4% of all charges go to a hearing
6 After a complaint is issued, the charging party (usually a union) may intervene
and become a party to the proceedings. If the Board rejects the General Counsel's
position, in whole or in part, the intervenor may petition for review in the Court of
Appeals. The intervenor then can petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court from
an unfavorable decision of the Court of Appeals. See UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205,
208 (1965) (holding that the successful charged party in NLRB proceedings has the
right to intervene in the appellate proceedings brought by the unsuccessful charging
party, as well as in the appellate review); Peter M. Appleton, NoteJudicial Retraction
of StandingLimitations in Review of NLRB Actions: UAW v. Scofield, 13 UCLA L. REV.
1408, 1417-18 (1966) (discussing the limits and the potential for expansion of the
Supreme Court's Scofield decision).
8 7 See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTtvE BARGAINING 138 (1976).
88 NLRB General Counsel's Quadrennial Report for FY 1984 Through FY 1988, 130
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 465, 472 (Apr. 17, 1989) [hereinafter NLRB General Counsel's
Quadrennial Report].
89 See 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 85, at 155 (indicating that 30.9% of the
charges are withdrawn and 35.7% dismissed before a complaint is issued).
'See id. at 5. In fact, 21% of the cases are settled before a complaint is issued.
See id. at 154. This figure includes all unfair labor practices. Discriminatory
discharges are not separately tabulated.
9' See id. at 157.
92 See id. at 8.
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before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).93
The procedure before the ALJ is relatively simple, compared
with court litigation, without the burdensome proliferation of
interrogatories, depositions discovery, and pre-trial motions. More
than half of the cases heard by an ALJ end there, either by accep-
tance of his recommended findings and order, or by settlement.
Less than 3% of all charges result in contested Board decisions.
94
The time required to process cases significantly affects the
effectiveness of the remedy. The median time between receiving a
charge and the issuing a complaint is forty-eight days; from issuing
a complaint to the close of an administrative hearing is 154 days;
from the close of the hearing to the ALJ's decision is 155 days; and
from that date to the date of the Board decision is 314 days.
95
Overall, from the date of the filing a charge to the date of a Board
decision, the median time is 688 days.9 6 If the case is appealed to
the Court of Appeals, another one to three years are added.
9 7
Although Board procedures are regularly criticized for their
slowness, 98 the time taken to resolve most cases is far less than in
suits for wrongful discharge or violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. Although median time figures conceal cases which drag
for years, 99 nearly 87% of all charges are in fact closed by with-
drawal or dismissal within forty-eight days, and another 9.5% are
settled before the administrative hearing begins or within 100
93 See id. at 211.
94 See id.
9- See id. at 196.
96 See id.
97 Petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court can add another year or two.
98 Numerous hearings have addressed the issue ofdelayin NLRB decision-making.
See 1988 Oversight Hearing on The National Labor Relations Board: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 Oversight Hearing]; Oversight of The National Labor Relations Board
(Part 2): HearingBefore a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986); National LaborRelations Board Case Backlog: HearingBefore a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
99 In 1987, there were 300 cases which had been waiting for decision by the Board
for more than two years, and 71 cases which had been waiting for more than five
years. See 1988 Oversight Hearing, supra note 98, at 38 (statement of James M.
Stephens, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board). The Board made a
special effort to reduce "average" cases, but in July 1988 there were still 178 cases
more than two years old and 36 cases more than five years old. See id. at 68-90
(statements of Rep. Tom Lantos, Chairman of the Employment and Housing
Subcommittee and John Truesdale, Executive Secretary of the National Labor
Relations Board).
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days. 1° This contrasts with the common pattern of settling civil
suits on the courthouse steps after four or five years of discovery,
depositions and other pre-trial activities, with out-of-pocket expenses
and the accumulation of billable hours.
In practice, however, the picture is not so idyllic. First, the
Board is not always a sympathetic tribunal, for it has become highly
politicized.10 1 The Board members and the General Counsel are
frequently selected on the basis of their sympathies for the union or
the employer. During the last twelve years most of the nominations
have been of management lawyers whose sympathies run more to
management than to the union or the individual employee.
0 2
This shift influences, at least on the margin, the development of
substantive rules, but more importantly it influences, in a subtle and
100 See 54 NLRB ANN. REP. 157 (1989); supra note 95 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., Harry L. Browne, The National Labor Relations Board: Labor Law
Rewritten, 49 A.B.A.J. 64, 64 (1963) (arguing that the NLRB "has relied on its own
policy rather than the congressional policy in interpreting the law" (footnote
omitted)); William N. Cooke & Frederick H. Gautschi, III, Political Bias in NLRB
Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 539, 539 (1982)
(presenting evidence that "strongly supports the popular belief that Board decisions
are heavily dependent upon shifting political winds"); David L. Gregory, The National
Labor Relations Board and the Politics of Labor Law, 27 B.C. L. REV. 39, 51-52 (1985)
(noting that the Board does reflect contemporary political values, but arguing that
these political choices can be "a positive, actualizing force"); Phil M. Landrum, The
National Labor Relations Board's Repeated Record of Deliberate Distortion, 12 J. PUB. L.
239, 249 (1963) (arguing that the Board's decisions are continually biased and that
the Board "respects neither the letter of the law nor the intent of Congress"); Lee
Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, PhaseI, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 96-98 (1985) (analyzing the
decisions issued by the Reagan Administration Board and their impact on national
labor policy); Mozart G. Ratner, Policy-Making by the New "Quasi-Judicial"NLRB, 23 U.
CH. L. REv. 12,19-33 (1955) (examining the sweeping character of the policy changes
made by the Board since the Republican administration elected in 1952 filled a
majority of the seats with its own appointees); Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy
Making and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 107 (1954) ("It is natural and proper
that with the change in political climate, there should be changes in the rules and
decisions of the Board. However, the Board should keep within the broad limits of
the basic statutory purposes."); Stephen C. Vladeck, The Nixon Board and Retail
Bargaining Units, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 416,416 (1976) (arguing that "the Board clearly
expressed the essentially antilabor bias that permeated substantial parts of the Nixon
administration").
102 See The Failure of Labor Law-A Betrayal of American Workers: Report of the House
Subcomm. on Lab.-Mgmt. Rel. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
14-16 (1984) (stating that because of the politicization of the Board, "the perception
of a neutral and objective NLRB has been shattered"); LawrenceJ. Cohen & Victoria
L. Bor, The National LaborRelations Act Under Siege: A Labor View of the Reagan Board,
31 PROC. ANN. INST. ON LAB. L. DEv. 4-1, 4-3 (arguing that the Reagan Board "is
probably the most result-oriented, antilabor, and antiworker Board in the history of
the Act").
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invisible fashion, the weighing of conflicting evidence which is often
crucial in individual discharge cases.103 It is true that most of the
cases are resolved by the Regional Offices or by ALJs whose
appointments are not so politicized, but the handling of cases at the
regional level would seem to be inevitably influenced by the general
attitudes as well as the directives and decisions of the General
Counsel and the Board.
Second, although the employee escapes the costs of litigation,
the price is that he loses control of the case. The decision on
whether his case has merit and should be prosecuted is controlled
by the Regional Director who follows the advice of the General
Counsel. 10 4 If the Regional Director refuses to issue a complaint,
an appeal can be taken to the Office of Appeals, but this is largely
a futile gesture because the Regional Director is reversed in less
than 4% of the appealed cases.10 5 This might suggest that Region-
al Directors are liberal in issuing complaints in borderline cases, but
the opposite is true. The "quality" of the Regional Office's work is
measured by the percentage of complaints upheld by Board
decisions. The General Counsel recently pointed with pride to the
fact that, in 1988, over 82% of the litigated cases were won in whole
or in part.
10 6
The employee who has a borderline or doubtful case will likely
find herself among those two-thirds who are rejected after investiga-
tion, but with no hearing or opportunity to present her case fully.
The rejection is final, for there is no judicial review of the General
Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint. 10 7 The employee's lack of
access prevents Board and court consideration of arguments which
103 See, e.g., Cohen & Bor, supra note 102, at 4-43 to 4-44. The following statistics
are suggestive:
Nixon-Ford Carter Reagan
Charges v. employers sustained 86.6% 85.7% 56.8%
Charges v. employers dismissed 13.4% 14.3% 43.2%
Charges v. unions sustained 72.8% 75.0% 84.6%
Charges v. unions dismissed 27.2% 25.0% 15.4%
Employer-won representation appeals 35.6% 44.4% 74.5%
Union-won representation appeals 64.4% 55.6% 25.5%
104 See 29 C.F.R. §§101.4-.8 (1992).
105 See NLRB General Counsel's Quadrennial Report, supra note 88, at 474.
1o See id. at 466.107 See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S.
112, 128 (1987) (holding that a postcomplaint, prehearing informal settlement
decision by the General Counsel is not subject to judicial review under the NLRA).
REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
would provide greater protection than existing precedent or new
principles with which the General Counsel disagrees. For nearly
twenty years after Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,108 the
General Counsel refused to issue complaints on behalf of black
employees who claimed that they had not been fairly represented by
their union.10 9 The Board was thereby prevented from consider-
ing whether this was an unfair labor practice. In 1962, as the result
of a complaint issued on other grounds and then amended, the
Board was confronted with the question and concluded that
violation of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor
practice.
110
Third, the remedy of reinstatement with back pay is less
adequate than first appears. Reinstatement is apparently considered
by most wrongfully discharged employees of no practical value.
Board statistics show that in 1990 back pay was ordered for 16,000
employees, but less than 3300 were reinstated.111 The rest either
settled for back pay without reinstatement or refused reinstatement.
Two factors deprive reinstatement of practical value for most
employees. Unless they are reinstated quickly, many will have found
anotherjob which they will be reluctant to leave; a 1974 study found
that 93% of those offered reinstatement within two weeks accepted
it, but only 5% of those offered reinstatement after six months
returned to their old jobs.112 Although the new job may pay less,
the employee often prefers to remain there rather than return to a
118 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
lo9 See e.g., Case No. K-311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (BNA) (Mar. 22, 1956) (involving
a refusal by the General Counsel to issue a complaint upon racial discrimination
charges made by employees against several employers and unions); see afsoJoseph L.
Rauh, Jr., Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874, 877 (1957)
(noting that "the Board has refused to act in the matter of racial exclusion"); Michael
I. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. L.
REV. 563, 591 n.107 (1962) (commenting on Case No. K-311 and Rauh's article).
110 See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 182, 190 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The complaint alleged a violation of Section 8(a)(3) on
the grounds that the union unilaterally controlled seniority, but by the time the case
came to the Board, this theory had been thrown in question by the Supreme Court's
decision in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). See
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. at 181-82. The Board then found a violation of
Section 8(a)(1), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2) and adopted a theory of fair representation.
See id. at 190.
"I See 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 85, at 143-44 (indicating that back pay was
ordered for 16,413 workers, 4026 workers were offered reinstatement, and 3294
accepted).
112 See Elvis C. Stephens & Warren Chaney, A Study of the Reinstatement Remedy
under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. L.J. 31, 40 (1974).
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hostile environment. The other and more pervasive reason for
refusing reinstatement is fear of employer retaliation. The
employee's perception is that returning to the old job will not work
out and the employer will find or manufacture some nondis-
criminatory reason for dismissal or will make life on the job
intolerable."
3
An award of back pay, though it replaces lost earnings does not
fully compensate the employee for economic loss. The discharged
employee may be forced to borrow or buy on credit, but interest on
lost pay is not granted. Even more devastatingly, she may be unable
to meet installment payments on her car, refrigerator, or house and
lose them. The employee may also have to move to another city to
find work, at considerable cost. None of these economic losses are
compensated, nor are damages awarded for emotional injury,
though such injury may lead to illness or other tangible injury.
An award of back pay has a limited deterrent effect on the
employer because interim earnings of the employee are deductible.
Employees have no choice but to seek other work, not only because
of the legal rule requiring mitigation of damages, but more
compellingly because of their need to support themselves and their
families until back pay is actually paid. Once the employee finds
other work, there is little incentive for the employer to settle.
The employer's costs of litigation are relatively small compared
with court proceedings because discovery, depositions and other
pre-trial procedures are replaced by the Board's processes of
investigation and conciliatory administrative procedures and the
adjournment of hearings in case of surprise. Employer lawyers
report that in a discriminatory discharge case the costs prior to an
ALJ hearing run from $2500 to $5000, and the costs through a
Board decision vary from $10,000 to $20,000-less than one fourth
the cost of an employment at will case.
114
In sum, the Board's remedies provide little deterrence of
violations. The average back pay award is about $2700, with slightly
less than a 30% chance that the employee will in fact be reinstat-
ed. 115  Many employers consider this a small price to pay for
n1 See Warren H. Chancy, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357,
359-61 (1981). The fears have roots in reality: almost 87% of those reinstated leave
within a year, 74% because of unfair treatment or dismissal. See id. at 360. For a
summarization of unfair treatment studies, see West, supra note 31, at 28-30.
114 These estimates have been reported to me in conversations with practitioners.
115 See 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 85, at 143-44.
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eliminating enough union activists, intimidating others, and
maintaining a union free environment.
C. Title V11 1 6
Enforcement of employment rights under Title VII combines
procedures through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) and private litigation. 117 Employees who are victims
of discrimination must begin by proceeding under state or local law,
if it provides relief, for at least sixty days or until the proceedings
are terminated.1 18 If the charge is first filed with the EEOC, the
Commission refers it to the state or local agency for at least sixty
days for the required proceedings.
1 19
At the end of the deferral period, if there is one, the EEOC
serves notice of the charge on the employer and then investigates
the charge. After investigation, the Commission determines
whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. If
the Commission finds reasonable cause, it must attempt to eliminate
the unlawful practice by the informal methods of conference,
conciliation, or persuasion. 120 If conciliation fails, the Commis-
sion may bring a civil action in federal district court, with the
person aggrieved entitled to intervene in that action.
1 21
Enforcement through the Commission is not exclusive. If the
Commission dismisses the charges, or fails to bring suit within 180
days from the date the charge was filed or the deferral to state or
local proceedings was terminated, the aggrieved person may bring
a private suit in the federal district court, with the Commission
entitled to intervene.
122
One critical characteristic is immediately apparent: although
employees who claim they are victims of discrimination are required
116 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-716 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)).
117 For a brief description of the EEOC procedure, see generally BARBARA L.
SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 933-1185 (2d. ed.
1983; N. Thompson Powers et al. eds., Supp. 1987-1989; David A. Cathcart ed., Five
Year Cum. Supp. 1989; & Supp. 1991).
118 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(c) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 20OOe-5(c) (1988)).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d); see also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 941.
120 See § 2000e-5(b); see also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 942-66, 984-
86.
121 See § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 966-67.
122 See § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 946-47,967,
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to initiate proceedings through the Commission, they do not lose
control of their claims. If the Commission finds reasonable cause
and proceeds to conciliation, no settlements are binding without the
consent of the aggrieved employees. 123 If the Commission brings
suit, the employees can intervene. 124  More importantly, the
employees' right to sue is not dependent on the Commission. Even
though the Commission finds a lack of reasonable cause, an
aggrieved employee can sue. 125 The employees need not even
wait for the Commission proceedings to run their course. After 180
days, they are entitled to a "right-to-sue" letter even if the Commis-
sion has not completed its investigation or has not attempted
conciliation.
126
The relative importance of Commission procedures and private
suits is indicated by the following data. In 1988, the EEOC received
58,853 charges for processing. 127 No cause was found in 35,148
cases, 9129 were settled, withdrawn with benefits, or conciliated,
and conciliation was unsuccessful in 1512 cases.128 In 1989, only
563 suits for employment discrimination were brought in the federal
district courts by the federal government, while 7470 were brought
by private plaintiffs.
129
Reliance by individual employees on enforcement through the
EEOC offers two advantages. First, investigation and conciliation
help eliminate unfounded claims and settle legitimate claims
without litigation. Second, this reliance avoids the need to obtain
a lawyer to pursue the claim. Reliance on the Commission,
however, carries the cost of delay and uncertainty as to aggressive
prosecution.
Processing cases through the EEOC is painfully slow. On the
average, 280 days are required to investigate a case and make a
determination as to reasonable cause and 255 days are consumed in
123 See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 966 & n.275.
124 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125 See § 2000e-5(ft(1).
126 See id.; see also ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 946-47.
127 1986-1988 EEOC COMBINED ANN. REP. 24 (1989).
128 See id. These figures include cases under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act, and cases which included combined charges
under those statutes. The figures for cases charging only violations of Title VII were:
received for processing, 42,657; no cause found, 24,836; settled, withdrawn with
benefits, or conciliated, 6953; unsuccessful conciliations, 818.
29 See 1989 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. at app. I at 22. In 1989,
the General Counsel's office reported 484 substantive suits filed by the EEOC and
114 subpoena actions. See 1989 EEOC OPERATIONS OFF. GEN. COUNS. ANN. REP. 21.
REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
conciliation efforts to obtain voluntary compliance and settle-
ment.15 0 When conciliation fails, the case is referred to the
General Counsel who uses forty or more days to determine whether
to recommend to the Commission that suit be brought.131 Then,
the Commission takes another forty days to decide whether to liti-
gate.1 3 2 Thus, the average case spans more than 600 days from
the filing of a charge until the case is referred to the General
Counsel to prepare to bring suit. This is the average processing
time; some stages may take twice as long.
13 3
The Commission's stated policy is that it will consider for
litigation all cases where reasonable cause is found and conciliation
has failed. 5 Unfortunately, this does not assure the victim of
discrimination that she will have an energetic advocate, or even an
advocate at all. For the fiscal year 1989, the Commission reported
1512 cases where conciliation was unsuccessful,1 35 but only 808
recommendations for litigation were made to the General Counsel
by the regional offices.13 6 The General Counsel recommended
only 714 cases to the Commission for litigation,1 37 and 484 suits
were filed.13 8 In short, the Commission brought suit in less than
30% of the cases in which reasonable cause was found and concilia-
tion failed.
The inadequacy of enforcement through the EEOC is, in large
measure, the result of inadequate funds to handle the caseloads,
which limits the EEOC's efforts and causes delays. Although the
Commission has repeatedly pointed out to Congress the need for
more adequate funding, the money has not been provided.13 9
13 0 See EEOC Delays in Processing Age Discrimination Charges: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th





134 See 19 EEOC ANN. REP. 5 (1984); New EEOC Policy Calls for Litigation in All
Cases Where Conciliation Fails, 56 White Collar Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 304 (Sept. 12,
1984).
135 See 1986-1988 EEOC COMBINED ANN. REP., supra note 127, at 120.
13 6 See 1989 EEOC OPERATIONS OFF. GEN. CouNs. ANN. REP., supra note 129, at
7.
137 See id. at 17.
138 See id. at 21.
139 See EEOC Delays, supra note 130, at 40 (statement of Clarence Thomas,
chairman, EEOC). When enforcement of the Age Discrimination Act was transferred
from the Department of Labor to the EEOC, the budget proposal contained no
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Because of the Commission's slow rate of processing cases and
the uncertainty that the Commission will bring suit, the great
majority of victims rely on private suits rather than on the Commis-
sion. 140 If a lawyer determines that the case is worth litigating, he
will ask for a "right-to-sue" letter and bring suit, getting to court a
year or more before the Commission would have begun preparing
to sue, if it decided to sue at all. It is not surprising that more than
90% of enforcement actions are brought by private plaintiffs.
141
This does not mean that the Commission's efforts are wasted in
these cases, for the plaintiff will be able to obtain the Commission's
investigation reports to prepare the case, thus reducing litigation
costs.
14 2
Whether suit is brought by the Commission or a private party,
the procedures and remedies are the same, except that the
Commission may, in appropriate cases, obtain a preliminary
injunction pending investigation and conciliation efforts.
143
Remedial powers are broadly stated in the statute. The court may
enjoin unlawful employment practices and "order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
... , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate."144 In cases of systematic discrimination, the remedies are
far-reaching. Courts may not only enjoin future violations, but may
also impose affirmative programs to correct the effects of past
discrimination. 145  In individual cases, the remedy has usually
been limited to hiring or reinstatement with back pay, with back pay
limited to two years prior to filing the charge.146 In exceptional
increase for this added burden. See 136 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 129, 147 (Feb. 11,
1991).
140 See, e.g., text accompanying note 129.
141 See 1989 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP., supra note 129, at 22.
142 Although sections 706 and 709 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit making
public any information obtained during the investigation and conciliation proceed-
ings, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e) (1988), the Supreme Court has held that
the charging party is not a member of the public within these two sections and can
be given access to the contents of the investigative files in his case. See EEOC v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590 (1981). The EEOC must make the
investigative file available to a charging party who is contemplating litigation. See id.
at 598, 603.
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2).
144 Id. § 2000e-5(g).
145 See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 1395-1417, 197-207 (1983 & 2d ed.
Supp. 1987-1989) (noting that courts may also provide for monetary relief).
46 See Fred W. Alvarez & Barbara Lipsky, RemediesforIndividual Cases of Unlawful
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cases where reinstatement is not practicable, the court may order
"front pay" for prospective wage losses, 147 a remedy mainly
utilized in age discrimination cases.
1 48
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, statutory remedies
protected individual employees from continued or repeated
violations of their rights and made them whole for lost wages.
1 49
Employees were not compensated, however, for emotional and
psychological injury, 150 which may be more substantial than any
monetary loss. Although back pay provides a measure of deterrence
for employers, 151 the lack of either emotional distress damages or
punitive damages allows racial, religious, and sexual harassment to
continue uncompensated and undeterred as long as the employee
is not actually terminated. The only deterrent for an employer in
harassment situations has been the cost of legal fees if the employer
contests the claim. This defect has been substantially ameliorated
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides for limited compen-
satory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimina-
tion.1
52
Title VII attempts to make remedies for employment discrimina-
tion more effective by providing that the judge shall assign the case
for hearing "at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to
be in every way expedited.1 53 Even so, the median time between
Employment Discrimination: A Law Enforcement Perspective, 3 LAB. LAW. 199, 209
(1987).
147 See ScHLI & GRossMAN, supra note 117, at 1434-36 & 203-04 (1983 & 2d ed.
Supp. 1987-1989).
' 48 See Bridget Flanagan, Comment, Front Pay as a Remedy Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 187, 187-88 (1985)
(acknowledging awards of front pay in Title VII cases, but questioning the
appropriateness of front pay awards under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); PeterJanovsky, Note, Front Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstatement Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 582 (1984)
("[Some] courts ... have allowed recovery of front pay (under ADEA] on the ground
that it is necessary to make a plaintiff whole when reinstatement is not possible.")
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
1o See ScHLEI & GROssMAN, supra note 117, at 1452 n.153, 1453 n. 161,207 (1983
& 2d ed. Supp. 1987-1989) (noting that compensatory and punitive damages are not
allowed under ADEA). Compensatory and punitive damages, however, may be
awarded in actions under § 1981 or § 1983, which may be joined with a Tide VII
action. See id.
151 But see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
152 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (a)).
's 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1988).
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filing and final disposition in a district court is eight months,
154
and, in 10% of the cases, it is as long as twenty-eight months.
1 55
For cases which go to trial, the median time until final disposition
is fourteen months, and for 10% of the cases it is more than thirty-
six months.1 56 In 1989, over a thousand cases had been pending
for more than three years.
1 57
One significant aspect of remedies under Title VII is the use of
the class action. If the EEOC sues, it need not be certified as class
representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and it may
seek injunctive relief and back pay for all affected by the challenged
practice.1 58 In fact, more than one fourth of the suits brought by
the Commission are class actions.159 Private suits, however, must
comply with Rule 23.160 Prior to the Supreme Court decisions in
1977161 and 1982,162 the courts were lenient in certifying class
actions, based on the belief that, "[a] suit for violation of Title VII
is necessarily a class action as the evil sought to be ended is
discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic." 163  There-
fore, Title VII cases were appropriate for across the board certifica-
tion for all types of discrimination, regardless of the type of
discrimination suffered by the plaintiff.164  The two Supreme
Court decisions mandated stricter compliance with the requirements
of Rule 23, making resort to class actions more complicated, but still
viable.
165
The class action has two substantial advantages. First, it
provides remedies in a single proceeding for a large number of
154 See 1989 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP., supra note 129, at 10.
155 See id. at 212.
156 See id. at 233.
157 See id. at 11.
158 See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980).
159 See 1989 EEOC OPERATIONS OFF. GEN. COUNS. ANN. REP., supra note 129, at
5. 160 See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 1216-70 (noting that unions and
civil rights organizations are bound by Rule 23 requirements).
161 See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-06
(1977) (dismissing Title VII class action on account of petitioner's failure to meet
both procedural and substantive requirements of Rule 23).
162See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (holding that an
individual litigant seeking to initiate a Title VII class action must meet the
requirements of Rule 23).
163 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
'64 See Bowe, 416 F.2d at 720.
165 See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 1216-70, 169-79 (1983 &
2d ed. Supp. 1987-1989) (discussing the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 to Title VII class actions).
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individual employees, including those who may not have filed a
complaint, or even knew that their rights had been violated.
Second, and more importantly, by including a large number of
people, a class action helps counteract the formidable power and
resources of the employer and makes the litigation financially
practicable for both the plaintiff and the lawyer when an individual
suit would not be practicable.
166
From the standpoint of efficacy of remedies, the most important
provision of Title VII empowers the court to allow the prevailing
plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees as a part of the costs. 167 The
plaintiff is viewed as a "private attorney[] general" 168 and is
awarded attorneys' fees as a matter of course in the absence of
special circumstances. 169  Attorneys' fees awards include fees
incurred representing the plaintiff before state fair employment
agencies and the EEOC.170 Furthermore, public interest law firms
are entitled to fees calculated at the same rates as private attor-
neys. 171  Contingent fee agreements will not limit the statutory
fees which the prevailing plaintiff may recover.172 The amount of
the fee is calculated on the basis of the hours reasonably spent on
the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for a lawyer of
166 Cf. David L. Biek, The Scourge of Age Discrimination in the Workplace: Fighting
Back with a Liberalized Class Action Vehicle and Notice Provision, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 103, 107 (1986) (noting that the Senate Committee agrees "with the courts that
Title VII actions are by their very nature class complaints, and that any restrictions
on such actions would greatly undermine the effectiveness of Title VII.") (quoting
FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE COMMrrrEE, S. REP. No.
415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1972)); David Scanga, Comment, Title VII Class Actions:
A New Era?, 62 NEB. L. REv. 130, 130-31 (1983) (noting that after the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, most federal courts concluded that Title VII actions were by definition class
actions).16 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
168 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
169 See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 68 (1980). See generally
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 1466-1511, 208-10 (1983 & 2d ed. Supp.
1987-1989) (discussing plaintiff's power to seek attorneys' fees award).
170 See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 117, at 1473-81.
171 See Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1982); Minority Employees at
NASA v. Frosch, 694 F.2d 846, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1982); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note
117, at 1480-81 n.9. But see EEOC v. Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 593 (2d
Cir. 1976) (holding that public interest firms entitled to fee award, but within court's
discretion to issue award lower than private law firm rate). See generally Note, Awards
of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARv. L. REV. 411, 415 (1973) (noting
statutory basis for attorneys' fees awards to Legal Aid offices).
172 See Sisco v. Alberici Constr. Co., 733 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that
"a percentage fixed in a contingent-fee contract is not an absolute ceiling on fee
awards"); Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1501 (10th Cir. 1983).
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equal competence and experience in the community. This "lode-
star" figure may be adjusted up or down based on a number of factors.
173
Without the provision for attorneys' fees, most victims of
discrimination would have no recourse except to the state agency,
where one is available, and the EEOC, with its wholly inadequate
resources. The legal costs of carrying a case to summaryjudgment,
even with the aid of the EEOC's investigative report,174 will
customarily be $20,000, and if the case proceeds to trial, the legal
costs will be at least double.1 75 Few individual victims can afford
to pay such costs. Contingent fee arrangements provide no solution
because recovery is limited to lost wages. Rarely would even a
sizeable percentage of this amount be sufficient to compensate an
attorney for her time and expense. In many cases, the attorneys'
fees awarded in Title VII cases are substantially more than the total
recovery of the plaintiff.
176
17s See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1983). The Court adjusted the
"lodestar" by applying the 12 factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve factors are: 1) the time and labor
required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly; 4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee; 6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys; 10) the "undesirability" of the case; 11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 717-19.
In a later decision, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), the Court stated that the
lodestar should be adjusted only in exceptional cases because many of the Johnson
factors were implicitly included in the hourly rate and number of hours. See id. at
895-96. The trend appears to be toward restrictive readings of all fee-shifting
provisions, so as not to allow contingency enhancement. See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950
F.2d. 771,782 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (interpreting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), as barring contingency enhancements).
174 See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also Janis G. White, Note, The
Use of EEOC Investigative Files in Title VII Actions, 61 B.U. L. REv. 1245, 1245 (1981)
(discussing inconsistency in case law regarding the appropriate use of EEOC files).
175 These estimations are based on my conversations with attorneys experienced
in this practice area.
176 See, e.g., Branch-Hines v. Hebert, 939 F.2d 1311, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1991)
(remanding for modification of the judgment to reflect special damages of $7000
while affirming an award of $10,098 for attorneys' fees); Dixon v. Sewage & Water
Board, No. 88-3553, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9916, at *12-*13 (E.D. La.July 17, 1990)
(awarding plaintiff $18,000 in compensation for the Title VII claim and $20,042.20
in attorneys' fees); Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 709 F. Supp. 396, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(awardingplaintiff $693.55 in damages and $6282 for attorneys' fees). For civil rights
cases in general, the Supreme Court has rejected "the proposition that fee awards
under § 1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil
rights plaintiff actually recovers." City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574
(1986). In Rivera, respondents were awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive
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Even so, the provision for attorneys' fees fails to assure an
employee whose Title VII rights are violated of finding a lawyer to
vindicate those rights. One commentator has noted that plaintiffs'
lawyers in equal employment cases "have become an endangered
species, in many places already extinct."
177
First, attorneys' fees are awarded only if the plaintiff prevails,
and in contingent fee cases the lodestar amount will not be
increased to compensate for the risk that the case will be lost. In
City of Burlington v. Dague,178 the Supreme Court refused to
approve a 25% enhancement, declaring that to do so would amount
to double-counting because the difficulty in establishing the merits
was one of the factors reflected in the lodestar. The Court refused
to allow any consideration of the risk factor on the grounds that this
would encourage lawyers to take cases with little chance of success
in the hopes of receiving a multiple enhancement.
Second, a number of courts, influenced by language of the
Supreme Court, have held that where a plaintiff prevails upon part,
but not all, of his claims, fees should be awarded only for the time
and costs expended on the winning claim.17 9 If a lawyer accepts
a case where there are several potential claims, some of which are
doubtful, she has a professional obligation to represent the client's
interests to the best of her ability and press all substantial claims.
damages and $245,465.25 in attorneys' fees. See id. at 561.
17PRay Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiff's Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation:
A Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 LAB. LAW. 63, 63 (1989); see also Civil Rights Act of 1990:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources on S.2104 to Amend the
CivilRights Act of 1964, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1990) (statement on behalf of the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund by Richard E. Larson); J.
LeVonne Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII at Twenty: The Continuing Challenge,
1 LAB. LAW. 235, 257-58 (1985) (criticizing efforts to lower attorneys' fees awards
given the prominent role of the private legal sector in initiating Title VII litigation);
Steven A. Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over Job Bias, N.Y.
TIMEs,July 24, 1991, at Al (documenting private lawyers' desertion of Title VII class
action cases).
178 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1992).
179 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (holding that "[w]here the
plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his
successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in
considering the amount of a reasonable fee"). For examples of reductions in fee
awards because of loss on some claims, see Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transp.
Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1987); Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 753 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1985); Waje v. City of Winchester, 773 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1985); King
v. McCord, 707 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1983). Where the issues are sufficiently related,
however, the court may allow full recovery of attorneys' fees. See Fite v. First
Tennessee Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1988); Fishman v. Clancy, 763
F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1985).
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But she then risks not getting paid for the time spent on the
doubtful claims, which may be the most difficult and time consum-
ing. The result may be refusal to take the case.
Third, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII does not
provide for payment of experts beyond the statutory witness fee of
$30 a day.180 Expert consultation and testimony are often indis-
pensable, particularly in disparate impact cases where the crucial
evidence is that provided by labor economists, sociologists, and
statisticians. The cost of these studies and testimony may be tens
of thousands of dollars.18 1 When these out-of-pocket costs could
not be recovered in successful litigation, many meritorious cases
could not be brought. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 corrected this
defect,.however, and explicitly provides for the recovery of experts'
fees as a part of attorneys' fees.
182
Fourth, the lawyer runs a risk of obtaining a settlement for the
plaintiff, but no fees for herself. If the employer offers a settlement
with no provision for an attorney's fees, the lawyer is ethically
obligated to communicate the offer to the plaintiff, and if the
plaintiff accepts, the lawyer is bound.1 83 The Supreme Court has
held that it is within the trial court's discretion to approve such
settlements, barring the lawyer from claiming an additional amount
for attorney's fees. 1 84 Once scorched by a fee waiver settlement,
a lawyer may refuse to take future cases.
Fifth, even though the plaintiff's lawyer thinks she has assurance
of ultimately recovering fully adequate attorney's fees and costs, she
may not be able to finance the litigation. It can require an
investment of hundreds of hours with heavy overhead expenses,
with no payment until after three or four years. If there are
appeals, the litigation may last ten years. Sole practitioners or small
firms, the mainstay of civil rights lawyers, often lack the reserves to
180 See West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1145-46 (1991);
Crawford Fitting Co. v.J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987).
181 For example, in Denny v. Westfield State College, 880 F.2d 1465, 1467 (Ist.
Cir. 1989), the expert witness fees in a sex discrimination case were $32,763. The
court recognized the need for expert witnesses, but held that in view of Crawford it
could not order reimbursement. The back pay awarded was less than $50,000.
Denny v. Westfield State College, 669 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D. Mass. 1987), aftd, 880
F.2d 1465, 1467 (1st. Cir. 1989).
'82 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(c) (West Supp. 1992).
'83 See Evans v.Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 755-56 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184 See id. at 742-43; see also Freeman v. B & B Assocs., 790 F.2d 145, 151 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (following the Supreme Court in Evans, holding that a district court not
enforce a settlement on the merits, and awarding attorneys' fees).
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carry such cases to conclusion.
Class actions are not as vulnerable to the problem of legal costs
as individual suits. Members of the class may each be able to make
small contributions to pay some of the expenses incurred, and a
contingent fee arrangement may be practicable because the total
recovery may be large. However, class actions are much more
complex, much more costly in time and expense to litigate, and take
longer to reach a final conclusion. Sole practitioners and small
firms are often unable to undertake these cases. Lawyers who
handle class actions have become "endangered species", as the
number of class actions has drastically diminished. In 1976, private
lawyers filed 1174 class actions in employment discrimination cases
in federal courts, 185 but by 1989 this had shrunk to forty-six class
actions.
18 6
The remedies for age discrimination have certain distinctive
aspects which are worth noting. The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act l87 was originally administered by the Depart-
ment of Labor, and its remedies were based on those under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Although the statute is now administered by
the EEOC, the remedial rights remain the same.
18 8
First, Rule 23 class actions are not available. Collective suits
may be brought, but each plaintiff must individually agree to
become a party.1 8' This raises problems of identifying and locat-
ing qualified potential plaintiffs and obtaining their consents. 190
Second, back pay can be awarded only for two years from the
bringing of the suit, not two years from the filing of the charge as
in Title VII cases.191 As a result, delays by the EEOC in investi-
185 1977 DIREcTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 239.
188 1989 DIRECrOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. app. I at 140.
187 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
18 8 See generally Albert F. Kuhl, Remedies Under theAge Discrimination in Employment
Act, 2 LAB. LAW. 229 (1986) (focusing on the remedies of backpay, liquidated
damages and front pay);J. Hardin Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 MD. L. REV. 298 (1986) (examining the legal and
equitable remedies available under the act).
189 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any
such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party .... ");
LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
only "opt-in" type class actions may be utilized in age discrimination cases).
190 The district court can order the employer to give names and addresses of all
similarly situated employees and approve a consent form to be sent to all such
employees. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989).
191 See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1988) (providing a two year statute of limitations from
the time the cause of action accrued).
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gating and conciliating are at the cost of the plaintiff, and if the
plaintiff waits until the EEOC process runs its course she may lose
her claim entirely.192 Plaintiffs, if they have a lawyer, will ordi-
narily seek a "right-to-sue" letter at the earliest possible time. Third,
the plaintiff is not only entitled to back pay and attorneys' fees, but
is entitled to liquidated damages equal to back wages if the violation
was "willful."193 The Supreme Court has left unclear what consti-
tutes willfulness, but it is enough if the employer either knew or
acted in reckless disregard for whether its conduct violated the
Act.194 Fourth, front pay is frequently awarded because reinstate-
ment is not practicable. 195 As a result, the monetary rewards are
often very substantial, so contingent fee arrangements make
obtaining a lawyer and litigating the case more likely. Even so, the
majority of the cases are brought by professional and managerial
employees, 196 suggesting that even liquidated damages and front
pay do not provide an adequate remedy for an average worker to
find a lawyer to vindicate her rights.
192 When enforcement was transferred to the EEOC, it failed to inform persons
filing charges under ADEA of the statute of limitations. In cases where investigation
and conciliation procedures continued beyond the two year limitation period, the
EEOC erroneously informed the complainants that their cases were still being
processed. As a result, the statute ran out on almost 1300 cases. See EEOC Delays,
supra note 130, at 27 (statement of Helen McDonald, AARP). A statute was passed
to save most of the defaulted claims. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) ("For the period in which
the EEOC is attempting to effect voluntary compliance of this chapter... the statute
of limitations as provided in section 255 ... shall be tolled, but in no event for a
period in excess of one year.").
193 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
194 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 129 (1985), in which
the Court affirmed the lower court's decision, 713 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1983), by
applying this test, but left open the effect of employer good faith. See also Kuhl, supra
note 188, at 236-41.
195 See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984);
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 726 (2d Cir. 1984); O'Donnell v.
Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 748 F.2d 1543, 1550-51 (lth Cir. 1984); Koyen v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Marion, supra
note 188, at 331-38 (noting that the weight of authority clearly holds that front pay
is an appropriate remedy under the ADEA); Flanagan, supra note 148, at 207-09
(arguing that when the remedy is denied, front pay "maybe the only available remedy
that will achieve the make whole objective of the [ADEA]"). But see Kolb v. Goldring,
Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874-74 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff in an age
discrimination suit cannot recover damages for future economic loss or front pay
even though injury from the discrimination continues).
196 See Michael Schuster & Christopher S. Miller, An EmpiricalAssessment oftheAge
Discrimination in Employment Act, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 64, 68 (1984) (noting
that 57.4% of cases are brought by professional or managerial employees).
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II. REMEDIES FOR UNDERCOMPENSATION:
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA)197 REMEDIES
Wage-hour cases, unlike job security cases, relate to terms and
conditions of on-going employment-minimum wages and overtime
premiums. The statutory remedies, like those under Title VII,198
are dual-tracked: suits for violations may be brought by either the
Secretary of Labor or aggrieved employees. 199 The remedies, on
their face, appear comprehensive. Either the Secretary or the
individual may sue for back wages, plus liquidated damages for an
additional amount equal to the back wages. 200 The individual
who sues also may recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
20 1
The Secretary may, in addition to suing for back wages with
liquidated damages, sue to enjoin future violations, 20 2 and, in
cases of willful violations, may refer the case to the Department of
Justice for criminal prosecution with potential penalties of fines up
to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to six months.
20 3
Primary responsibility for enforcement is, in principle, through
the Department of Labor.204 Enforcement proceedings begin
with an investigation by a compliance officer of the Wages and
Hours Division. 20 5 Seventy-nine percent of all investigations are
triggered by complaints filed by employees or "concerned citi-
zens." 206 In initiating the enforcement proceedings, the compli-
ance officer reviews the payroll records which the employer is
required by law to keep, 20 7 and where the records are inadequate,
she interviews employees. 20 8 She identifies the type of violations,
197 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
198 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
199 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(c).
200 See id.
201 See id. § 216(b).
202 See id. § 217.
203 See id. § 216(a).
204 See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, No. 60, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CHANGES NEEDED TO DETER VIOLATIONS
OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 3 (1981) [hereinafter GAO REPORT I]. For a
description of the enforcement procedures, see Stephen G. Wood & Mary Anne Q.
Wood, The Fair Labor Standards Act: Recommendations to Improve Compliance, 1983
UTAH L. REV. 529, 546-48.
205 See Wood & Wood, supra note 204, at 546.
206 See 1989 U.S. DEP'T LAB. ANN. REP. 65. In fiscal year 1989, the Wages and
Hour Division conducted 74,197 compliance actions, of which 58,449 were initiated
by such complaints. See id.
207 See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c).
208 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 12.
1992]
492 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:457
tabulates the amount of back wages due, and attempts to obtain an
agreement with the employer to comply with the law in the future
and to pay the back wages due.2°  If the compliance officer is
unable to obtain an agreement, the area director attempts to
negotiate settlement. 210 If this fails, the case may be referred to
the regional office of the Solicitor of Labor in order to bring a
suit.211 Further attempts to settle may be made both before and
after filing suit.212 More than 95% of all compliance actions are
settled before referral to the Solicitor, and suit is filed in almost
one-half of the cases referred to the Solicitor.
213
Enforcement through the Department of Labor has marked
weaknesses. First, the agency is woefully lacking in the necessary
resources. Compliance officers are able to investigate only 2% of
the covered establishments each year.214 Although efforts are
concentrated in retail, wholesale and services trades where more
than half of the violations occur,215 there are not enough compli-
ance officers to make even a random check on these establishments.
Because three-fourths of the investigations are initiated by employee
complaints, 216 only one-fourth of the meager resources remain to
investigate situations where employees are too uninformed or too
afraid to complain. It is estimated that the Department of Labor
discovers only one-fifth of all underpayments. 217 The lack of
resources, in addition to limiting investigation of possible statutory
violations, weakens enforcement after an investigation has been
initiated. Where payroll records are lacking due to employer record
209 See Wood & Wood, supra note 204, at 546-47; see also GAO REPORT I, supra
note 204, at 4.
210 See Wood & Wood, supra note 204, at 547.
211 See id.; see also GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 4.
212 See Wood & Wood, supra note 204, at 548.
213 See id. at 548-50 (stating that of the 2951 FLSA cases referred to the Solicitor
in fiscal year 1981, actions were filed in only 1234 cases, or 42%). In that year, there
was a total of 68,464 FLSA investigations. See 1981 U.S. DEP'T LAB. ANN. REP. 22.
214 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 84; 1981 U.S. MINIMUM WAGE STUDY
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION 156 (1981) (estimating
that 3% are inspected each year) [hereinafter MWSC]. In fact, between 1981 and
1984, the compliance staff was reduced by 15%. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE
UNITED STATES, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., No. 77, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR STANDARDS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
AND LABOR: THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT 5 (1985) [hereinafter GAO REPORT II].
215 See MWSC, supra note 214, at 152-54.
216 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
217 See MWSC, supra note 214, at 155-56.
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keeping violations, investigators do not have the time to track down
all employees and interview them.211 Inadequate settlements are
accepted because of the costs of collecting adequate proof,219
pursuing litigation, and updating investigations prior to finalizing
settlement agreements. 220 Settlement agreements are not fol-
lowed up to see if violators subsequently comply. 221 Liquidated
damages for willful violations are only available after a jury
trial, 222 and due to a lack of resources and a shortage of available
attorneys, such suits are not brought.223 Criminal prosecutions
are not pressed because the Department of Justice, also lacking
adequate resources, assigns these cases a low priority.
224
Second, record keeping requirements 225 on which enforce-
ment relies heavily are widely ignored because no civil penalties are
assessed for violations, 226 and criminal prosecutions 227 general-
ly are not pressed.228 At most, a court will issue an injunction
ordering compliance with the record keeping requirement, but
failure to comply with this order leads to only small monetary
penalties. 229 Employers learn that it pays not to keep records
because the lack of records makes proof of violations and the
imposition of back wage liability much more difficult.2 0 Thus,
218 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 12.
219 See id. at 8-9.
220 See id. at 51-55; GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, at 3, app. I at 7.
221 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 55-57; GAO REPORT II, supra note 214,
at 3, app. I at 7.
222 See McLaughlin v. Owens Plastering Co., 841 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1988).
223 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 38-41. Other major reasons for not
filing such suits include crowded dockets, hesitance in bringing FILSA cases before a
jury, the low priority assigned to labor cases in federal district courts, and inadequate
evidence caused by record keeping violations. See id. In 1985, the U.S. General
Accounting Office identified some improvement in this situation, noting that the
Department of Labor was filing more suits for liquidated damages than it had in
1981, and that these suits resulted in the collection of liquidated damages in some
cases and increased settlements due to larger initial claims. These results, however,
varied from region to region. See GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, at 4-5, app. I at
10-11.
224 See GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 3-4.
225 See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1988).
226 See id. § 216(b).
227 See id. § 216(a).
228 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 8. Nearly one-half of the dosed civil
cases involved record keeping violations, with 12% involving "falsified or concealed
records." Id. at 8-9.
229 See id. at 8; GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 8.
230 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 8. Some employers stop keeping
records after the first inspection. See id. at 10, app. I at 25.
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proof often must be obtained through employee testimony, but
most employees have incomplete records and unreliable memories,
and they may be reluctant to testify, or may have long since left the
scene.231  Because the evidence is uncertain, cases often are
settled for a portion of the wages due or are abandoned entire-
ly. 23 2 Record keeping violations are most prevalent in the low
wage industries and among small employers, the very situations in
which it is most difficult to obtain reliable employees' testimony.
Third, employees' recoveries are wholly inadequate. A primary
factor leading to insufficient recovery is the pressure for settlement
that results from lack of resources or lack of record keeping.
233
The total back wages an employer agrees to pay in settlement may
be little more than half of the back wages found by the investigator
to be owed during the preceding two years. 23 4 When the Secre-
tary brings suit it is almost always for an injunction, which allows
recovery of wages but does not allow liquidated damages. 23 5 This
is to avoid the cost and delay of a jury trial, which is required to
recover liquidated damages. The statute limits recovery to two years
from the time suit is brought, or three years if the violation is
willful, but it is normally a year after an investigation begins before
a suit is filed.23 6 The result is that if suit is brought, the employee
may collect only one year's, or at most two years' underpayment,
with no prejudgment interest for the delay in receiving pay-
ment.23 7 Employees lose even more because inflation erodes the
value of recovery.
Fourth, the enforcement procedures through the Department of
Labor do not deter violators. Because there are too few compliance
officers, a violator only has one chance in five of getting
231 See id. at 12; GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 8-9, 11.
232 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 8-11; GAO REPORT II, supra note 214,
app. I at 9.
233 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
234 See MWSC, supra note 214, at 157. The GAO found a restoration figure of
60%, which included wages employers agreed or were ordered to pay back to
employees. See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 5.
235 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 214, app. I at 2, 5. Only 4.4% of compliance
cases reach trial where liquidated damages could be assessed. See GAO REPORT I,
supra note 204, at 33.
236 See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 5.
237 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at 50-51, 57-59. Presettlement interest is
assessed in only 6% of the cases, as it is usually negotiated away in reaching a
settlement. See id. at 57; GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 5.
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caught.2 8 If caught, the violator is assessed only for underpay-
ment for the previous two years.239 It can then negotiate for a
settlement and, particularly if the record keeping requirement is
also violated, the violator might be able to settle for substantially
less then the full underpayment.
240
The employer, however, does not necessarily pay even the full
amount of the settlement. If the employer cannot find an employ-
ee, she keeps the money,241 and there is no systematic follow up
to determine if each violator has paid the full amount owed.242
If the case is not settled, but is instead referred to the Solicitor, the
employer's liability will be further negotiated downward, or reduced
by the amount of time the Solicitor takes to prepare the case before
bringing suit, because the statute of limitation runs from the date
suit is brought, usually a year or more after the violation is found.
It is estimated that less than two-thirds of the assessed underpay-
ment is in fact paid, 243 and it is paid without interest for the
period between the date it was due and the date it is paid. In
economic terms, it pays the employer to violate the statute.
In addition, repeat violations are not deterred. The agency has
had no pattern or policy of investigating violators to determine
whether they have changed their ways,244 and repeat offenders do
258 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
239 See GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 5.
240 FLSA compliance officers in 1989 found $29 million due 151,000 workers for
minimum wage violations and $131 million due 338,000 employees for overtime
violations. Employers agreed to pay $21 million in unpaid minimum wages to
124,000 workers, and $101 million in unpaid overtime to 287,000 employees. See
1989 U.S. DEP'T LAB. ANN. REP. 65-66; see also, GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app.
I at 9 (finding a strong correlation between record keepingviolations and settlements
for less than the amount of estimated back wages).
241 If the Secretary litigates the case under § 217 and obtains an injunction with
an order for back pay, the employer is obligated only to compensate those employees
who can be found. See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, app. I at 2 n.2. If, however,
she sues under § 216(c) for liquidated damages, the amount due unfound employees
is paid into the Treasury. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). Suits are seldom brought under
§ 216(c) because of the delay due to the requirement of trial byjury. See supra note
223 and accompanying text. Settlement, therefore, is commonly based on what might
be achieved by a § 217 action. See 29 U.S.C. § 217.
242 See GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 7.
243 See id. app. I at 2. In 1977, Labor Department investigations found that $88
million was assessed for overtime violations, but only $33 million was paid to
employees. See Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Paul L. Schumann, Compliance With the
Overtime Pay Provisions of The Fair Labor Standards Act, 25J.L. & EcoN. 159, 165 n.14
(1982).
244 See GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, app. I at 6-7.
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not suffer any additional penalties.245 Even when an injunction
has been obtained to prohibit future violations, the penalties for
contempt are smaller than the costs of compliance,246 and the
criminal penalties are rarely used.247
It is no surprise that more than one out of three violators is a
repeat offender.248 In the words of the GAO, "chances of discov-
ery are slim, penalties are unlikely and the rewards of withholding
employees' back wages can be great."249 The one-third repeat
offender statistic actually underestimates the problem. Employees
who have complained once may be reluctant or unable to complain
a second time, for they may have seen their fears of retaliation
realized. At best, they may have received little back pay and
recognized no improvements in the employer's behavior, and
therefore may see the filing of a second complaint as a quixotic
gesture.
Individual employees, instead of filing a complaint with the
Department of Labor, may sue the employer directly. 250 Few such
suits are brought, and for good reasons. First, many employees do
not know that their rights are being violated. Many low wage
workers may not know the law, or the underpayment may be
disguised by deductions for food, tools, uniforms or other charges.
Employers may deny high salaried workers overtime pay to which
they are legally entitled by denominating them supervisors or
administrative personnel, by not paying them for waiting or on-call
time, or by using other devices.
Second, individual employees are reluctant to make claims
because they justifiably fear losing their jobs, despite the statutory
prohibition on retaliation for filing claims. 25 1 Apart from fear of
245 See GAO REPORT 1, supra note 204, at 32.
246 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
248 According to GAO REPORT I, supra note 214, at 23-24, 37% of all employers
found in violation are repeat offenders, many with three or more former violations.
The report states that, "many employers repeatedly violated the same sections of the
Act, and that others falsified or concealed records." Id. These findings indicate that
violations are willful. See also MWSC, supra note 214, at 151-53 (discussing factors
contributing to noncompliance with FLSA overtime provisions); Ehrenberg &
Schumann, supra note 243, at 161-180 (utilizing an economic model to demonstrate
the costs and benefits of noncompliance and positing that some employers
consciously weigh these factors when deciding whether to comply with the FLSA).
249 See GAO REPORT 1, supra note 204, at 23.
250 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
251 See id. § 215(a)(3).
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retaliation, employees may be persuaded by their employer that if
she is required to pay the minimum wages there will be no jobs, or
that insistence on premium pay will lead to reduction of hours and
take-home pay. Not surprisingly, most of the individual suits are
brought by workers who are no longer employed by the defendant
employer, and joinder of a back pay claim with a retaliation claim
is common.
252
Third, individual claims are customarily small. The average
minimum pay claim is less than $200 and the average overtime
claim is less than $400.253 This is due, in part to the statute
limiting back pay to two years from the date suit is brought, except
in cases of willful violation where the limitation is three years.
254
Although liquidated damages may double this amount, the claims
are often not sufficiently large to lead an employee to bring suit,
particularly where there is fear of retaliation.
Violations of the statute seldom involve only a single individual.
Rather, they constitute practices which apply generally to a group
or category of employees. The statute, however, does not allow the
ordinary class action, but only a representative action.255 Similar-
ly situated employees may be joined as parties plaintiff, but each
plaintiff must consent in a writing filed in court.256 This require-
ment makes bringing suit more burdensome, particularly in
minimum wage cases, because the employees are often transient or
252 See, e.g., Townley v. Floyd & Beasley Transfer, No. 88-AR-0907-S, 1989 WL
205342 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 1989) (plaintiff no longer employed by defendant); Reyes-
Garcia v. New Garden Farms, Inc., No. CIV. A. 88-1629, 1989 WL 16288, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 24, 1989) (plaintiffs claimed defendants failed to timely pay wages and took
retaliatory action).
25 This estimate is based on personal experience and conversations with
practitioners. See also supra note 240 and accompanying text. The cases in which
representative suits for a number of individuals are brought are, of course, much
larger. Some may be substantial, especially suits by a group of employees for
overtime. See, e.g., McKenzie v. City of Ottawa, No. CIV. A. 87-2153-0, 1989 WL
45392, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 1989) ($53,581 for five firefighters and four
dispatchers); Brusstar v. SEPTA, No. CIV. A. 85-3773, 1988 WL 137319, at *1-*2
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1988) ($526,330 for 200 bus drivers).
254 See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). A violation is "willful" if the employer "knew or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the
FLSA." McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 130 (1988). The behavior
must be "conduct that is ... not merely negligen[t]." Id. at 133.
255 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
2 See G.W. Foster, Jr.,Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies For Group Wrongs Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 WIs. L. REv. 295, 327;
Thomas Ashby, Note, Notice to Class Members Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
Representative Action Provision, 17 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 25, 25 (1983-1984).
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change jobs often, making it difficult to locate many of them. The
consent procedure also discourages participation for it requires
each plaintiff to identify herself in the face of fear of retaliation.
Individual or group suits have two advantages over the proce-
dures of the Wage-Hour Division. First, liquidated damages are
regularly claimed and recovered, 257 in stark contrast to cases
enforced by the Wage-Hour Division.
258
Second, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs, 259 and these can be substantial. Moreover, the size
of the plaintiff's claim does not limit the attorneys' fees allowed.
Hourly rates of $100 to $300 an hour are allowed, depending on
lawyers' rates in the area and the individual lawyer's billing
rates.260  A survey of reported cases for two years shows attor-
neys' fees and costs running up to $60,000,261 and in a large
majority of cases the legal costs were substantially more than the
back wages. This is particularly true in the minimum wage cases.
For example, in one case the back wages were $4725, while the
attorney's fees and costs were $15,578.262 In another case the
back wages with liquidated damages were $2288, and the attorney's
fees and costs were $7437.263 A marked characteristic of these
cases is that few were individual suits; most were brought by groups
of employees ranging from four to two hundred individuals. 264
In many of the situations, however, it would appear that there were
others similarly situated who were not made parties to the suit.265
257 See, e.g., Townley v. Floyd & Beasley Transfer, No. 88-AR-0907-S, 1989 WL
205342, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 8,1989) (awarding plaintiff statutorily required amount
of liquidated damages); Bru slar, 1988 WL 137319, at *2 (awarding plaintiffs $263,165
in liquidated damages).
218 See GAO REPORT I, supra note 204, at iv-v; GAO REPORT II, supra note 214, at
5,p. I at 9, 14-15.
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
260 See e.g., Reyes-Garcia v. New Garden Farms, Inc., No. CIV. A. 88-1629, 1989
WL 16288, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1989) (determining value of attorney's time
from her normal billing rate and legal reputation); Fields v. Luther, No.JH-84-1875,
1988 WL 121791, at *3 (D. Md. July 12, 1988) (noting that billing rates for lawyers
in Baltimore and Washington, D.C. range from $110 to $300 per hour).
261 See, e.g., McKenzie v. City of Ottawa, No. CIV. A. 87-2153-0, 1989 WL 45392
at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 1989) ($58,637 attorney's fees); Brusstar v. SEPTA, 1988 WL
137319, at *9 ($59,216 attorney's fees and costs).
262 See Colunga v. Young, 722 F. Supp. 1479, 1487-88 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
263 See Fields, 1988 WL 121791, at *1, *3. In one overtime case, the wages owed
were $311 and the attorney fees $5977. See Gary v. Health Care Servs., Inc., 744 F.
Supp. 277, 278 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
See, e.g., Brusstar, 1988 WL 137319, at *1 (action by more than 200 SEPTA
employees).
265 See, e.g., Fields, 1988 WL 121791, at *4 (citing difficulties of migrant farm
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From this limited survey of cases it would seem that when suits
are brought, the employees obtain a substantial remedy, and the
award of attorneys' fees and costs makes bringing suits possible,
even though the wages recovered are not large. Even so, minimum
wage cases, as contrasted with overtime cases, seem to be brought
predominately by legal aid and public interest group lawyers.
Under City of Burlington v. Dague,266 courts cannot enhance the
lodestar amount because of the risk of uncertain outcome, and this
tends to discourage other lawyers from taking such cases. The
provision for legal costs in wage-hour cases have all of the shortcom-
ings discussed in the Title VII cases, except that the cases generally
do not require as large an investment of time and expenses.
It might seem that individual suits would be a substantial
deterrent to violations. With liquidated damages and attorneys' fees
and costs, the total liability may be three to twenty times the
underpayment.2 67 Add to this the employer's costs in defending
a suit, and the exposure should be a strong deterrent. Individual
suits, however, do not in fact provide an adequate remedy or a
substantial deterrence. In 1989, the Department of Labor found
74,197 violations, and these constituted only about one-fifth of all
violations. 268  In that year there were only 732 private suits
brought for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.269 These suits
represent only 1% of the violations found by the Department of
Labor, and only .2% of all violations. In practical terms, individual
suits border on irrelevancy.
It is not clear why there are so few individual suits, but certainly
major contributing causes are the employees' lack of knowledge of
their rights and how to enforce them, and their reluctance to make
claims for fear of losing their jobs.
It is quite clear, however, that the combination of enforcement
through the Department of Labor and individual suits is ineffective
to protect workers. Although only a small proportion of employ-
ment is in the minimum wage area, in 1979, 5% of all covered
establishments were in violation of the minimum wage.
270
Twelve-point-four percent of all wage and salary employees were
workers in initiating actions due to their itinerant nature and language barriers).
266 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1992).
267 The underpayment is usually for three years because the violations are willful
and there is no delay in bringing the suit, as there is when the Solicitor of Labor sues.268 See 1989 U.S. DEP'T LAB. ANN. REP. 65; supra note 240 and accompanying text.
2 69 See 1989 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. app. I at 178.
270 See MWSC, supra note 214, at 161.
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receiving the minimum wage or less. Of these, half were earning
less than the minimum wage. 271  Violations of the overtime
provisions were even more prevalent, with 21% of all covered
establishments failing to pay overtime premiums.
272
III. REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
A. Occupational Safety and Health Act Remedies
The declared purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health
(OSH) Act 273 is "to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions."2 74 The Act imposes on employers a general duty to "fur-
nish to each of his employees employment and a place of employ-
ment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees" and
to "comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgat-
ed under this chapter."275 Employees, however, have no indepen-
dent statutory remedies for violations or for injuries resulting from
violations. Employees are totally dependent on the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for protection.
Enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Department of
Labor, begins with inspection of the workplace by an OSHA
compliance officer.2 76 After an inspection, which may include
examination of injury and illness records and a "walk around" of the
plant, the compliance officer discusses with the employer any
conditions that she considers violate safety and health standards.
The compliance officer then reports the violations to the OSHA
area director who discusses the report with the employer; the area
director may then issue a citation, propose a fine, and require
abatement of the violation within a stated time. 277 If the employ-
271 See id. at 8.
272 See id. at 161. Another study of noncompliance with the overtime provisions
found that approximately 10% of covered workers who worked overtime failed to
receive the statutory premium. Ehrenberg & Schumann, supra note 243, at 163.
273 29 U.S.C §§ 651-678 (1988).
274 Id. § 652(b).
275 Id. §§ 654(a)(1)-(2).
276 For a detailed description of the inspection procedure, see generally OSHA
FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, 3 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 1[ 7964.100-.800
(July 12, 1990) [hereinafter OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL].
277 If the inspector finds conditions that could reasonably be expected to cause
death or serious bodily harm before normal enforcement procedure could eliminate
them, he may request the Secretary of Labor to seek a restraining order in a United
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er contests the citation, the case is heard by an ALJ. Her decision
is binding unless it is appealed and one of the members of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) calls
for a "discretionary review." If review is called for, the case will be
considered by the full Commission. The Commission's decision or
a refusal by the Commission to grant discretionary review may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals by any party to the proceed-
ings.
278
Employees whose rights to a safe and healthful workplace are at
stake have only a limited role in the enforcement process. An
individual employee or "representative of employees" may file a
formal (i.e., in writing and signed) complaint with the area direc-
tor,279 thus triggering an inspection.80 But an informal com-
plaint, such as one made by telephone, will not result in an
inspection unless it alleges imminent danger which could cause
death or serious physical harm.28 1 The only action taken on an
informal complaint is sending a letter to the employer notifying it
of the complaint and advising it to take corrective action. Although
employees may trigger inspections by filing complaints, they face
the risk of retaliation by the employer, for the statutory guarantee
of anonymity may not give full insurance.28 2 Section 11(c) of the
Act prohibits discrimination for filing a complaint, but as will be
shown later, this in practice gives employees less than adequate
States district court. See 29 U.S.C. § 662.278 See id. § 661(j); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 478 (Stephen A.
Bokat et al. eds., 1988).
279 See 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1).
280 An inspection will be triggered only if OSHA finds reasonable grounds to
believe that there is a violation. See id.
281 In its early years, OSHA inspected only in response to formal written
complaints. In 1975, OSHA changed its policy and conducted inspections in response
to all complaints, including those made by telephone and anonymously. Inspections
in response to formal complaints were "wall to wall"; but inspections in informal
complaints cases were limited to those areas involved in the complaint. In 1979 this
policy was reviewed by the General Accounting Office which concluded that a large
proportion ofcomplaint inspections did not involve serious risks. As a result, in 1980
OSHA changed its policy to inspecting all formal complaints, but only those informal
complaints which alleged imminent danger of "extremely dangerous working
conditions." Robert S. Smith, Greasing the Squeaky Wheel: The Relative Productivity of
OSHA Complaint Inspections, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 35,47 (1986). Subsequent
research indicates that during the period from 1977 to 1980 complaint inspections
in fact produced as many serious violations as did general scheduled inspections and
that inspecting only formal complaints did not increase the productivity of
inspections. See id.
282 See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c).
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assurance. 283  Twenty percent of inspections are triggered by
employee complaints, 28 4 but a substantial portion of these are
filed by unions or in worlqclaces where the collective agreement
protects employees from discipline without just cause.
285
When an inspection is made, whether as the result of an
employee complaint or not, an "employee representative" is entitled
to accompany the compliance officer in his walk around the plant
and participate in the informal conference with the employer at the
end of the inspection.
28 6
In the absence of a recognized union, however, there is no
established procedure for selecting an employee representative, and
an individual who has filed a complaint has no right to participate
in the inspection her complaint has triggered. The result is that in
the great majority of inspections there is no employee representa-
tive to accompany the compliance officer.287 Employee participa-
tion in non-union workplaces is limited to random discussions with
employees by the compliance officer during the inspection. The
value of the right of an employee representative to accompany the
compliance officer is further diluted by OSHA's revocation in May
1981 of its rule requiring employees to be paid for the time spent
during the walk around and in the opening and closing conferenc-
es. 2
88
283 See generally, James H. Swain, Protecting Individual Employees: Is It Safe to
Complain About Safety?, 3 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 59, 83-85 (1988) (stating that while
a complaint to OSHA is protected, not all filings with state authorities are protected,
and that courts have differed on the protection accorded the various complaints).
284 See OSHA Reports Federal and State Inspection Data for Fiscal 1991, [1991-1992
Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Heath Guide (CCH) 1 11,152 (Feb. 4, 1992).
285 This situation has been related to me in conversations with practitioners
experienced in this area.
288 See 29 U.S.C. § 657(e); see also OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note
276, at 11 7964.250, 7964.575 (stating that the compliance officer "shall ensure that
employee representatives are afforded the opportunity to participate in all phases of
the workplace inspection" and that employee representatives have a right to attend
any informal conference with the employer).
287 OSHAjustified conductinginspections without an employee representative on
the ground that "selection of employee representatives in non-union establishments
would entail complex and time-consuming procedures that would seriously delay the
conduct of inspections and effective and efficient enforcement of the Act."
Revocation of Walkaround Compensation Regulation, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,842, 28,845
(1981). OSHRC defines "authorized employee representative" in its regulations as
"a labor organization that has a collective bargaining relationship with the cited
employer and that represents affected employees." 29 C.F.R. § 22 0 0.1(g) (1991).288 See Revocation ofWalkaround Compensation Regulation, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,842
(1981). The statute does not by its terms require walkaround pay, see Leone v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1975), but walkaround pay may be required
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After an inspection, if the area director refuses to issue a
citation there is no judicial review; the only recourse of a complain-
ant employee or employee representative is an internal appeal to
the assistant regional director.289 If a citation is issued, an em-
ployee or employee representative cannot contest the characteriza-
tion of the violation as willful, serious or non-serious, the size of the
fine, or the adequacy of the abatement ordered, but can only
contest and appeal to the Commission on the reasonableness of the
time allowed for abatement.
290
If the employer contests the citation, an employee or employee
representative can then become a full party and challenge all aspects
of the citation or its withdrawal before the Commission. 291 They
cannot, however, challenge any settlement reached between OSHA
and the employer,292 and 90% of the contested citations are
settled before reaching the Commission. 293  Employees or em-
by regulation. In 1977, the Secretary issued an "interpretation" rule requiring
walkaround pay, see 42 Fed. Reg. 47,344 (1977), but this was vacated for failure to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. See Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The rule was reissued
in the dosing days of the Carter Administration, see 45 Fed. Reg. 75,232 (1980), but
was revoked within five months by the Reagan Administration. See 46 Fed. Reg.
28,842 (1981).
289 See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.12(a) (1991). Where there is an alleged imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury, and the Secretary arbitrarily fails to seek an
injunction, an employee who is at risk or her representative may seek a writ of
mandamus from the U.S. district court. See 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1988).
20 See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1903.17(b) (1991); UAW, Local 588 v.
OSHRC, 557 F.2d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that an employee representative
may insist only that OSHRC review the reasonableness of the period of time fixed in
citation for abatement of violation); cf. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union,
474 U.S. 3, 6 (1985) (holding that the Secretary of Labor has unreviewable discretion
to withdraw citation charging employer with violation of OSH Act); Jonathon J.
Nadler, Note, Employee Participation in Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (1985) (stating that employees
may begin a contest only by alleging that the period of time fixed in the citation for
abatement of the violation is unreasonable).
291 See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 646
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that a labor union representing affected employees can
appeal an OSHRC decision when the union has participated as a party in the
proceedings). In 1988, employers contested 6.8% of citations. See U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR & OSHA, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH FOR FISCAL YEAR 1988, at V-14 (1990) [hereinafter 1988
PRESIDENT's REPORT]. This is an increase from 2.7% in 1985. See id.
292 See Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 474 U.S. at 7 ("A necessary adjunct of [the Secretary's]
power is the authority to withdraw a citation and enter into settlement discussions
with the employer."). Employees or employee representatives may, however,
challenge a settlement as to the reasonableness of the abatement date. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 659(c); Donovan v. OSHRC, 713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983).
29 3 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAw § 366
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ployee representatives are entitled only to be notified of the
negotiations and to present their views, nothing more.
294
Because enforcement is so completely controlled by the agency,
employees' rights and remedies depend heavily on the effectiveness
of OSHA's enforcement-its resources, its aggressiveness in
correcting violations, and its willingness to impose penalties to deter
willful and persistent violations. OSHA's protection of employees'
rights is flawed both in structure and administration. First, the
statute provides no remedy for employees victimized by violations,
even if the violations are willful or repeated. Meat-processing
employees with paralyzed arms and mutilated hands, textile workers
disabled by white lung, and the families of construction workers
buried in collapsed buildings obtain no recovery under the statute.
OSHA may assess large fines, but the money goes to the govern-
ment and not to the victims. 295 Their only recovery may be under
wholly inadequate state workers' compensation statutes, most of
which take no account of the employer's safety and health viola-
tions.
296
Second, inspections are too few and far between to discover
more than a small fraction of violations. In 1988, OSHA had only
1181 compliance officers 297 to inspect 4,500,000 firms employing
(1990).
24 See Boise Cascade Corp., 4 EmpI. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 1 29,222 (Feb.
19, 1991) (holding that union had been afforded a sufficient opportunity for input
in settlement negotiations where the Secretary had informed the union on several
occasions of the negotiations and had given the union opportunities to discuss its
concerns); see also National Steel & Ship Bldg. Co., 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
1 29,127 (holding that employees or their representatives must have an opportunity
to provide input before the employer reaches a finalized settlement agreement with
the Commission).
295 See 29 U.S.C. § 666(l).
296 In some states, workers' compensation awards may be increased by a certain
percentage if the employer's violation of safety laws caused the injury. See CAL. LAB.
CODE § 4553 (West 1989) (50% increase); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 28 (Law. Co-
op. 1989) (100% increase); OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35 (50% increase); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.57 (West 1991) (15% increase to a maximum of $10,000). If the injury results
from a statutory violation of another employer, the employee will have a third party
action and the statutory violation may be per se negligence in some states. See
ROTHSTEIN supra note 293, § 513.
29 7 See NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INST., FAILED OPPORTUNITIES: THE DECLINE
OFJOB SAFETY IN THE 1980'S 11 (1988) [hereinafter FAILED OPPORTUNITIES].
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65 million workers,298 and made less than 59,000 inspections, 
2 N
thus covering less than three million employees. If the sparse
resources were spread evenly, each establishment would be
inspected about every seventy-five years. OSHA, however, targets
for inspections those industries which have the highest accident
rates. As a result, 83% of the inspections are in construction and
manufacturing.3 0 0 Even in the target industries, however, inspec-
tions are made only every eight to ten years,30 1 which is too seldom
to deter violations. When inspections are made, 69% of construc-
tion workplaces and 73% of manufacturing workplaces have
violations.
3 0 2
Because construction and manufacturing industries were
targeted only about 10,000 inspections were made in all other
industries,3 03 which together employ 75% of the workforce3s4
The result is that workplaces in other industries are almost never
inspected unless an employee files a formal complaint. Employees
outside construction and manufacturing are therefore effectively
without protection because most employees are fearful of retaliation
if they file complaints before the danger is realized, and inspections
are otherwise triggered only in when an employee is killed or there
is a catastrophe.
3 0 5
Third, the civil penalties imposed are too small to provide
substantial deterrence. In 1980, the average penalty proposed for
non-serious violations was $2.04, and for serious violations, those
298 See Oversight of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 1988: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988)
(testimony of Lynn Williams, Chairman, AFL-CIO Standing Committee on Safety and
Occuational Health).
See 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 291, at V-14.
3oo See id. at V-13 to V-14. Inspections made because of formal complaints by
employees are not limited to targeted industries, and inspections are made in all cases
of fatalities. See id.
301 See id.; see also DON LOFGREN, DANGEROUs PREMISES: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF
OSHA ENFORCEMENT 215 (1989) (estimating targeted industry inspection rate at once
every five to six years for those requiring "special emphasis" and less frequently for
other establishments).
302 See 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 291, at V-13.
s03 See id.
3o See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
305 In a five year period only 2% of the over 300,000 restaurant and apparel
establishments were inspected, an average of once every 250 years. U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTING OFF., HRD-130 BR, "SWEATSHOPS" IN THE UNITED STATES: OPINIONS
ON THEIR EXTENT AND POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS 45-46 (1988) [hereinafter
'SWEATSHOPS' IN THE U.S.]. Forty percent of the apparel establishments and 60% of
the restaurants inspected had violations. See id. at 46-47.
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where there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical
harm could result was $303.47.06 Penalties proposed for willful
or repeated violations averaged $5272.75 in 1988.07 The amount
actually paid, however, is generally about one-third the proposed
amount because more than 90% of all citations are settled by
negotiation with a reduction or elimination of the fine, s30 usually
in exchange for the employer's agreement to correct the unsafe
condition.-39 Settlements are driven by two principle consider-
ations. The Solicitor's office lacks the resources to prosecute all the
contested citations,31 0 and the agency is primarily interested in
protecting employees in the future rather than punishing employers
for past violations. The purpose of the statute, it is said, is
corrective and not punitive.
Appealing as this policy may be, the lack of substantial penalties
provides little incentive for employers to take corrective action until
306 See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
307 See 'SWEATSHOPS' IN THE U.S., supra note 305, at 47.
308 Between March, 1986 and February, 1990, in a 45-case sample of "egregious"
violations, fines were reduced in 72% of the settled cases (which constituted 28% of
the sample), and in 95% of the litigated cases. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. No. 05-92-008-10-001, REvIEW OF How OSHA SETTLED AND
FOLLOWED UP ON ITS EGREGIOUS CASES 7, 15 (1992) [hereinafter REPORT OF
INSPECTOR GEN.]. Of more than $36 million in proposed penalties for the settled
cases, OSHA negotiated to receive $10.3 million and actually collected $9.9 million;
in litigated cases, OSHA received $21,900 of the $121,500 due, reduced by courts
from more than $3 million in penalties proposed. Id. See also FAILED OPPORTUNITIES,
supra note 297, at 20-21 (listing examples of reductions of large proposed fines). A
study of the 50 largest corporations showed that the average fine collected per
citation was less than $250. JAMES DONAHUE, WORKERS AT RISK: A SURVEY OF
OSHA'S ENFORCEMENT RECORD AGAINST THE 50 LARGEST U.S. CORPORATIONS 4
(1991).
309 USX was assessed fines totalling $7,300,000 for 1700 violations at its Fairless
Hills and Clairton plants. These were settled for $3,300,000 with the company
agreeing to abate the hazards cited and to implement corporate-wide programs on a
number of other safety and health hazards. USX Corp. Accepts Fine of $3.3 Million to
End OSHA Case, WALL ST.J., Dec. 21, 1990, at A70. IBP was assessed fines totalling
$5,700,000 for 1038 continued willful underreporting violations and more than 625
other egregious wilful violations. These were settled for $975,000, with an agreement
by the company that it would institute substantial corrective and preventative
measures. See Marianne Lavelle, When Fines Collapse: Critics Target OSHA Settlements,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4, 1989, at 1. John Morrell and Co. had 800 out of 2000 employees
injured in one year at a single plant, and a $5,000,000 fine was reduced to $437,000.
See Thomas E. Quigley, Employee Involvement in the OSHA Settlement Process, 1990 DET.
C.L. REV. 579,590. For ajustification of this process of negotiating settlements, see
REPORT OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 308, at 11-16. For a biting criticism of this
process, see LOFGREN, supra note 301, at 222-25.
310 See REPORT OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 308, at 4, 61.
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after they are cited for violations. 1 1 Eliminating unsafe and
unhealthy conditions is often very costly and may require large
capital investments in ventilation systems, safety devices, and
redesigned equipment. Eliminating unsafe conditions may also
impose increased operating costs in shoring trenches, maintaining
guard rails and safety nets, and identifying and substituting non-
toxic replacements for the toxic substances being used. With the
prospect of inspections at eight or ten year intervals, the savings
from noncompliance may well be far greater than the fines, even
before they are negotiated downward. Fines, even large ones, do
little to deter serious willful or repeated violations.
Fourth, abatement orders and employer agreements to abate do
not assure employees a safe and healthful workplace. Follow-up
inspections to determine whether the hazards continue are
conducted in less than 10% of the cases,312 although in 32% of
the follow-up inspections the employer has failed to abate.31  In
90% of the cases where a violation has been found, a statement by
the employer, even over the telephone, 14 that the hazard has
been abated is accepted as sufficient.3 1 5 Again, this is justified by
the lack of resources to make the follow-up inspections. If there is
a follow-up and the employer's failure to abate is discovered,
enforcement procedures are seldom sought in the courts.3
1 6
311 The standard for determining the size of the penalties do not require
consideration of the employer's economic benefit from the violations. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/HRD-92-48, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH:
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS ARE WELL BELOW MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PENALTIES 6
(1992) (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency policy requires that "penalty
amounts be at least as great as the economic benefit.., an employer receives from
not complying with the law").
312 See 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 291, at V-14. In 1988, 58,354
employers were inspected, with approximately 40% found in compliance, meaning
that approximately 35,000 employers were found in violation, but there were only
3399 follow up inspections. See id.
313 See PHILIP I. SIMON, REAGAN IN THE WORKPLACE: UNRAVELING THE HEALTH
AND SAFETY NET 66 (1983). A GAO Report in 1991 found that in at least 24% of
follow-up inspections, cited hazards had not been corrected. See GAO Report on
Adequacy of OSHA Abatement Confirmation Policies, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Empl.
Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 1 10,927 (June 11, 1991) (stating that GAO had
"recommended that OSHA promulgate a regulation requiring employers to submit
detailed evidence of what corrective actions have been taken to abate hazards").
314 See REPORT OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 308, at 25 (noting that OSHA has
at times received confirmation of abatements "by telephone conversations with
employers or third parties or, in one case, not at all").
315 See id. at 25.
316 See id. at 20. One of the consequences is a delay in enforcement. In one
instance, OSHA waited 33 months beyond the waiting period to seek a decree, leaving
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Instead, OSHA issues new citations and seeks new settlements.
3 17
In such abatement violation cases, the average penalty is less than
$1029,318 not enough to provide an incentive to comply where
abatement is costly. Even though the employer abates the cited
hazard, this gives no assurance that it will not later repeat the
violation or commit other violations, which might be discovered at
the next inspection five years later.
3 19
The limited effectiveness of enforcement is less a product of the
size of the fines than of the lack of inspection. Large fines are
possible under the statute. Although the maximum penalty for a
non-serious or serious violation has been $1000 and for a willful and
repeated violation $10,000,320 where a number of employees are
exposed to the same hazard, the exposure of each employee may be
treated as a separate violation.3 21  Thus, a single dangerous
employees exposed to asbestos for almost three years. See id. at 21.
317 See id. at 20-21 (noting that rather than enforcing a settlement agreement with
Ford Motor Company, OSHA issued citations and entered new negotiations, though
the old agreement had not been honored).
318 See 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 291, at V-14.
319 In 1988 Zinc Corporation ofAmerica agreed to abate lead standard violations
and pay $614,000. A follow-up inspection found ten failures to abate, five willful and
14 serious violations. A $208,500 penalty was proposed. See Empl. Safety & Health
Guide (CCH) No. 1046, at 3-4 (May 14, 1991). In 1983 and 1985, ABC Utilities
Services, Inc. was cited for five violations of trench safety standards that resulted in
a fatal cave-in accident. In 1987, another employee was killed in an unshored trench.
OSHA charged the company with 23 willful and three serious violations, proposing
penalties of $231,400, but agreed to settle for $55,700. The company was criminally
prosecuted and convicted on two misdemeanor counts. See id. at 3.
320 29 U.S.C. § 666. The statute also provides criminal penalties of up to $10,000
and 6 months imprisonment for first-time convictions, and penalties of up to $20,000
and one year imprisonment for subsequent convictions. See id. § 666(d). Criminal
cases are prosecuted by the Department ofJustice, which considers such cases a low
priority. Between 1970 and 1987 only 41 cases were referred to the Department of
Justice; 14 were prosecuted with 10 convictions, but no jail sentences were imposed.
See Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 874, at 1-2 (Feb. 9, 1988). In 1989,
OSHA was criticized by the Department of Labor Inspector General for its reluctance
to use criminal sanctions. See Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 965, at 2-3
(Nov. 7, 1989). This criticism was renewed in December 1990, see Empl. Safety &
Health Guide (CCH) No. 1024, at 2 (Dec. 18, 1990) (noting also that the Department
of Labor has no system for recording data on criminal investigations), and again in
June 1992. See Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 1104, at 3-4 (June 15, 1992)
(noting OSHA's argument that criminalization of reckless violations would potentially
affect "[t]ens of thousands of cases each year").
321 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 293, § 252. In 1986, OSHA instituted a policy of
degrouping violations (treating each infraction as a separate violation for penalty
purposes) of employers who flagrantly violated safety and health standards in so-called
"egregious" violations. In the period of fiscal year 1986 to fiscal year 1990, however,
this policy was applied in only 124 cases. The purpose was to deter other employers
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condition such as an unguarded machine or benzine fumes can
generate multiple citations with penalties possibly reaching into the
millions of dollars.- 22  OSHA, however, generally has not used
this device, but has grouped the violations, issuing one citation
where it could issue tens or hundreds.3 23 The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 199024 increased the maximum fines for
non-serious and serious violations from $1000 to $7000, and for
willful or repeated violations from $10,000 to $70,000.325 The
motivation behind these increases, however, seemed to have been
geared more towards reducing the deficit than reducing the
incidence of safety and health violations.
It is doubtful if fines can be practicably made large enough to
substantially deter many serious violations so long as employers are
inspected only every five or more years.3 26 The fines would need
to be extremely large to offset the savings from noncompliance in
the intervening years. Employers would inevitably claim, sometimes
with justification, that payment of such a fine, in addition to
correcting the condition, would drive them out of business. This
makes OSHA reluctant to assess large fines and leads it to reduce
fines upon the agreement of the employer to use the money to
correct the violation. But there is often no follow-up inspection to
assure that the employer has lived up to its agreement. Effective
enforcement is possible only with frequent inspections and with
.systematic follow-up to insure that violations are in fact abated.
This focuses on the crucial structural weakness of OSHA-the
by publicizing the large fines in these cases. See REPORT OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra
note 308, at 7.
322 In cases of underreporting, a fine may be assessed for each failure to report.
For examples, see infra note 335. In other cases where there are "egregious"
violations, OSHA will assess separate penalties. Thus, BASF was fined $1,061,000,
with 104 willful violations for exposing 104 employees to explosion and fire hazards
after an explosion and fire killed two employees and injured 17 others. See Empl.
Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 1020, at 2-3 (Nov. 20, 1990).
323 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 293, § 252. The practice of degrouping violations
in some instances so as to impose larger penalties began in 1985, with the multiple
citations for wilful underreporting of accidents. See infra note 335 and accompanying
text.
324 29 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. II 1990).
32 See id. A first-time, willful violation which causes death is punishable as a
crime with a maximum fine of $10,000 and six months imprisonment. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 666(e) (1988). This was not increased in 1990.
326 See W. Kip Viscusi, Market Incentivesfor Safety, HARV. BUS. REV.,July-Aug. 1985
at 133, 135; Note, A Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act: The Limits of Punishment and Culpability, 91 YALE L.J. 1446, 1457-59
(1982).
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lack of adequate resources; 1181 compliance officers cannot provide
adequate inspection.3 27 With such limited resources, the agency
cannot even consider what inspections are needed, but can only
consider how best to utilize wholly inadequate resources. The root
of the problem, of course: the budget. Congress is quite willing to
declare its purpose "to insure every working man and woman safe
and healthful working conditions," but is unwilling to provide the
funds needed to fulfill that purpose.
3 28
The effectiveness of OSHA remedies in protecting employees
depend in part on the policies of the administration. In 1981, the
Reagan administration adopted what it described as a less confron-
tational approach with greater emphasis on cooperation with
employers in getting them to achieve compliance.329 Between
1980 and 1982, the total number of inspections decreased only
3%,330 but this figure, however, disguised the true extent of the
decrease in the number of inspections, because of an increased
emphasis on inspections in the construction industry. When a
construction job site is inspected, each contractor and sub-contrac-
tor is considered separately. This means that an inspection of a
single job site is counted as several inspections, corresponding to
the number of contractors and sub-contractors which are on the job.
The number of employees covered by inspections was reduced 40%
over this period and the number of violations cited was reduced
25%.331 The non-confrontational policy naturally led to smaller
fines so that the fines assessed dropped more than 75%.
332
327 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
328 The first Reagan budget reduced OSHA's budget by nearly 7%, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR & OSHA, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 9 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 PRESIDENT'S
REPORT]. The budget was increased in subsequent years, but the 1989 budget was
only about 16% more than the 1981 budget. See 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra
note 291, at xiv. In the eight years, the non-agricultural work force had increased by
19%, and the value of the dollar had decreased 35%. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1990, at 384, 478. The net effect was
a 25% reduction in resources for enforcement.
329 See SIMON, supra note 313, at ii.
330 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Structure and Enforcement ofJob Safety Regulations, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 127, 136.
331 See DONAHUE, supra note 308, at 20, 22. This tells only half the story, because
the reductions were largely in serious violations, and willful and repeat violations,
indicating a more tolerant attitude toward violations and less concern for the risks to
employees. Serious violations were reduced by nearly half, and willful or repeat
violations by about 70%. Non-serious violations were reduced by only about 3%. See
1981 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 328, at 53.
332 See supra note 330, at 139.
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During this period the "records only" inspection was intro-
duced.,333 In this inspection the compliance officer first examined
the employer's accident records for the last two or three years. If
those records showed an accident rate less than the national average
for manufacturing, no further inspection was made and no
employee representative was contacted. By 1983, "records only"
inspections counted for 15% of all inspections.3 4  After four
years, not surprisingly, OSHA discovered that employer cooperation
included a widespread practice of not reporting all accidents so as
to keep their accident rates below the national average, thereby
keeping the inspector from going beyond the front office.
3 3 5
Companies such as Union Carbide, Champion International,
Chrysler, USX,33 6  DuPont,3 3 7  General Motors,338  Caterpil-
lar,3 3 9 John Morrell,3 40  and Scott Paper,3 41 were cited for
massive underreporting. "Records only" inspections have now been
eliminated, but a good accident record may lead to only a "partial
inspection"-a "brief walkaround" to survey those areas "believed to
have the greatest hazard potential."3 42
The record keeping violations marked a change in assessing
333 See Viscusi, supra note 330, at 140. Employers are required by statute to
"maintain accurate records" of work-related injuries and exposures to potentially toxic
materials. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c).
334 See Viscusi, supra note 330, at 141 (given 10,400 record check inspections and
58,500 inspections excluding record checks in fiscal year 1983).
335 See Underreporting of Occupational Injuries and Its Impact on Workers' Safety:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong.,
1stSess. 9(1987). Although meatpacking has the highest injury rate in industry, even
above mining and construction, "Records Only" inspections were made of IBP, the
largest meatpacker in the industry, until 1987. See id. at 8. The inspection was
triggered by a union complaint that the company was keeping two sets of records,
and was not completed until March 1987. See id. at 29-30. Inspectors found 1038
wilful underreporting violations and proposed a fine of $2,590,000. See Empl. Safety
& Health Guide (CCH) No. 846, at 3 (July 28, 1987). They also found that 400 of the
3,000 employees suffered cumulative trauma disorders because of the excessive speed
of the assembly line and assessed an additional fine of $3,139,900 for more than 625
health and safety violations. The fines, totalling nearly $6,000,000, were settled for
$975,000. See id.
3s6 See Willis J. Goldsmith, Current Developments in OSHA: Willfulness Citations
Under the 1986 Record-Keeping Guidelines, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 346, 349 (1987).
317 See Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 846 (July 28, 1987).
338 See Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 857 (Oct. 14, 1987).
339 See Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 897 (July 19, 1988).
340 See Quigley, supra note 309, at 590-92.
341 See Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 856 (Oct. 6, 1987).
342 OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 276, 1 7962.105 (modifying
chapter I.B.5.b.a).
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penalties, as OSHA counted each misreporting as a separate willful
violation, and "mega-fines" ranging up to more than two million
dollars were proposed. 43 This method of assessing penalties has
since been applied to other willful violations, with proposed fines up
to six million dollars.344 Although these "mega-fines" are regularly
reduced, as are other fines, the amounts paid may still be more than
a million dollars. Large fines, however, remain the exception, with
the average of proposed fines in 1988 not significantly larger than
that of 1988, when indexed for inflation.345 These fines still are not
enough to spur corrective action.
Employees may use self-help by refusing to do dangerous work,
but the statute provides them only limited protection. Section 11(c)
prohibits discrimination against an employee for filing a complaint,
instituting a proceeding, testifying, or "because of the exercise by
such employee on behalf of himself or others[,] of any right
afforded by this chapter."3 46  In Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,3 47
two workers refused to go out on a wire-mesh screen suspended
twenty feet above the ground where two employees had previously
fallen through. The Supreme Court held that their refusal was
protected by section 11(c), but narrowly circumscribed this right.
The condition must be one which the employee "reasonably believes
pose[s] an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury."
3 48
The employee must further have "reason to believe that there is not
sufficient time or opportunity either to seek effective redress from
343 See supra note 335.
344 See supra note 335.
345 Average proposed fines per occurrence (in dollars):
Type of Violation 1980 1985 1988
Serious 303.47 194.65 261.38
Other-than-serious 2.04 .55 1.64
Willful, repeat 1947.48 887.88 5272.76
Failure to abate NA 503.00 1029.09
Average of all 189.26 76.77 290.57
See 1988 PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 291, at V-14. It appears that in the last two
years OSHA has proposed and enforced more substantial fines, at least in a limited
number of extreme cases. See e.g., Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 1028, at
2 (Jan. 15, 1991) (stating that ARCO had paid a fine of $3,481,300 for an accident in
which 17 people were killed); Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) No. 1062, at 1
(Aug. 27, 1991) (stating that Phillips 66 had paid a $4,000,000 fine for a fire and
explosion in which 23 workers were killed and 130 injured).
346 29 U.S.C. § 660(c).
347 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
348 Id. at 10.
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his employer or to apprise OSHA of the danger." 49 The employ-
ee's good faith belief either as to the danger or time to appeal to
OSHA, will not entitle the employee to protection: the belief must
be objectively reasonable. The employee thereby risks a later
finding by one not faced with the danger that -the belief was not
reasonable.,350 In addition, the employee is not entitled to receive
pay for the time lost while refusing to do the work.35 1 Because
of these strictures, in the absence of the most imminent danger,
employees cannot safely use self-help, but must look to OSHA
procedures to protect them.
3 52
Potentially, the most effective method of an employee protecting
herself from dangerous conditions is filing a complaint with OSHA.
Section 11(c), however, provides little assurance of protection from
retaliation either for filing a complaint or for refusing dangerous
work. 5 3 The courts have held that an employee cannot bring
suit, but must seek relief by filing a complaint with OSHA.3 54 If,
after investigation, OSHA determines that the complaint is without
merit, the employee may not appeal except within the Department
of Labor. If the complaint is found meritorious, OSHA will attempt
to settle. If this fails, the case is referred to the Solicitor of the
Department of Labor who decides whether to sue in the District
Court.3 55 In 1985, 2433 complaints were filed, but only 291 were
found meritorious.3 56  Sixty-seven cases were ultimately sent to
the Solicitor, who pursued approximately half of them-a little more
than 1% of the complaints filed. 57
349 Id. at 10-11.
350 See generally Kenneth L. Smukler, Comment, Individual Safety Protests in the
NonUnion Workplace: Hazardous Decisions Under Hazardous Conditions, 89 DICK. L. REV.
207, 228-30 (1984) (discussing the ramifications of Whirlpool).
351 See Whirlpool, 445 U.S. at 19.
352 Whirlpool will rarely apply where employees are exposed to health hazards, as
opposed to safety hazards, because of its requirement that an employee be exposed
to "imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury." 445 U.S. at 10.
353 See generally Swain, supra note 283, at 96 (criticizing the § 11(c) enforcement
mechanism); Kevin J. Worthen, Comment, Retaliatory Discrimination Actions Under
Section 11(c) of OSHA: Too Many Rights, Not Enough Protection, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV.
909, 911-12 (discussing the procedure for commencing an action).
354 See e.g., Taylorv. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256,258-63 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding
no private right of action under § 11(c)).
355 See Swain, supra note 283, at 94-95.
356 See EUGENE R. FIDELL, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR HEALTH AND
SAFETY WHISTLEBLOWERS: A REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES A7 (1987).
357 See id.
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The small proportion of complaints found meritorious and the
small number of suits brought apparently reflect the pervasive need
to make the most of inadequate resources. In Taylor v. Brighton
Corp.,35 8 discharged employees filed a complaint under section
11(c). The Solicitor, in an amicus brief, urged the court that the
employee be allowed to sue because the Department had neither the
resources nor the personnel to handle all section 11(c) complaints,
and that individual suits offered the only realistic hope of protecting
employees from retaliatory discharge. 359  The Sixth Circuit's
response was that "[t]he Secretary should address his arguments to
Congress, not the courts."3 60 The response of Congress was to
provide OSHA a smaller budget for the following year than the year
before.3 6 1 This case epitomizes the failure of OSHA to "assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions."3 62 Total reliance for protect-
ing the declared rights of employees is placed in an agency which
is denied by Congress the needed resources, and by an administra-




The employee's right to compensation for work-related injuries
is enforced through fifty independent state agencies and three
federal agencies.36 4 Because of differences in both the substan-
tive provisions and the varied administrative procedures utilized by
each of these agencies, generalizations may mask wide variations.
In addition, because the fifty-three agencies have no standard system
of record keeping or data collection, aggregate data may not only
358 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
359 See id. at 263.
360 Id. at 264.
361 See 1981 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 328, at 9 (showing appropriations of
$209,376,000 in 1981); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & OSHA, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO
THE CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 3
(1983) (showing appropriations of $195,430,000 in 1982).
362 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
363 The § 1 l(c) remedy also suffers from the more common inadequacies of court
delay, lack of interim reinstatement, and the seeming lack of understanding or
sympathy by district courts.
64 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1990 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAWS vii (1990) [hereinafter 1990 ANALYSIS]. The three federal plans are for the
District of Columbia, federal employees, and longshore and harbor workers. See id.
For a comparative overview of the various statutes, see id. at 3-45.
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contain distortions, but also may not provide an accurate picture of
any individual state or federal program.
3 65
Despite differences, all workers' compensation systems make the
employer strictly liable to its employees for work-related injuries,
commonly described as "accidents arising out of and in the course"
of employment 66 The employer is liable for all medical costs
and must pay statutorily prescribed benefits for physical disability,
loss of earnings and death. The employer may also be liable for
costs of rehabilitating the injured worker to employability.
3 67
Many minor work accidents do not lead to workers' compensation
proceedings. Employees are often given basic first aid or medical
attention at the workplace. If an employee visits her own doctor
after a minor incident, the physician will simply send the bill to the
employer. An employee may be then given paid leave or light work
until able to return to a regular job. 68
Typically, workers' compensation proceedings begin with the
employee notifying the employer, the appropriate agency, or both,
of an injury. Failure to give notice in the time specified by the
applicable law-"immediately," "as soon as practicable," and "within
30 days" are three of the more commonly used statutory phrases-
may bar the employee from claiming benefits retroactively to the
date of the injury, or from filing a claim later.3 69 The second step
is filing a claim with the agency, for which there is a much longer
time limit-commonly one or two years. If the employer or its
insurance carrier contests the claim, it will be set down for a hearing
before an administrative law judge, referee or arbitrator employed
by the agency, who will then issue an award. This award may be
appealed administratively to a board or commission, whose decision
is subject to judicial review.
370
36 5 See Ronald Conley &John Noble, Workers' Compensation Reform: Challenge for
the 80's, in I RESEARCH REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION TASK FORCE 147-48 (1979).
66 John D. Worrall, Compensation Costs, Injury Rates, and the Labor Market, in
SAFETY AND THE WORK FORCE 1 (John D. Worrall ed., 1983).
367 For a summary of benefits, see 1990 ANALYSIS, supra note 364, at 17-29.
368 See Lois R. Sincere, Processing Workers'Compensation Claims in Illinois, 1982 AM.
B. FOUND. RES.J. 1073, 1081 (suggesting that many injuries are not accounted for
due to poor record keeping). About 80% of all cases involve only medical benefits.
See Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 45.
369 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5400 (West 1992) ("within 30 days"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-9-80 (1992) ("immediately" or "as soon thereafter as practicable"); IDAHO
CODE § 72-701 (1992) ("as soon as practicable but not later than sixty (60) days").
370 For a comprehensive description of the specific procedures followed in
processing claims in each state, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE WORKERS'
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Permanent partial or permanent total disability and death
benefits constitute only a small percentage of all workers' compensa-
tion claims, but are the most frequently contested. The great
majority of all cases only involve the payment of medical bene-
fits. 3 71 Relatively few of these cases are contested. In addition,
only 3% of cases involving temporary partial disability and 8% of
temporary total disability cases are contested.3 72 Because the loss
of earnings is temporary, the insurance carriers find it is not
economical to contest these smaller claims, although they raise the
same legal issues as permanent disability cases-compensability of
the accident and degree of impairment.3 7 3 In contrast, 33% of
permanent partial disability cases, over 50% of the permanent total
disability cases, and 40% of the death benefit cases are contest-
ed.3 74 The result is that the bulk of contested cases involve claims
for permanent disability, partial or total, or death, which by their
nature involve substantial sums of money.
Of the contested cases, nearly two-thirds are settled by agree-
ment prior to the first level hearing.3 75 Only a small percentage
are appealed to a higher administrative level or to a court.
Although there are wide variations from state to state,3 76 the
national average of contested cases going to a second level of
hearing was less than 4%.3
77
Settlements without a hearing, although expeditious resolutions
of contested claims, are not an unblemished virtue, for they may be
obtained at the expense of the injured employee. The insurance
carrier is always represented by a lawyer experienced in workers'
compensation, but the employee is sometimes unrepresented,
particularly when approached by the carrier representative with an
COMPENSATION: ADMINISTRATIVE PROFILES (1987) [hereinafter STATE PROFILES].
37l See MONROE BERKOwrrz & JOHN F. BURTON, JR., PERMANENT DISABILITY
BENEFITS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION vii (1987); see also Conley & Noble, supra note
365, at 45.
372 See Merton C. Bernstein, Litigation, Representation and Claimant Protection in
Workers' Compensation, in 1 RESEARCH REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS'
COMPENSATION TASK FORCE, supra note 365, at 115, 129.
373 See id. at 130 (discussing the cost-benefit calculus facing insurers).
374 See id. at 129.
375 See id. at 131.
376 A 1978 survey of nearly 6000 cases in Illinois found that 6% were appealed to
administrative review and less than 1% reached judicial review. See Sincere, supra
note 368, at 1087.
377 See Bernstein, supra note 372, at 132.
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offer of settlement.3 78 In cases of permanent disability or death,
where substantial amounts are at stake, roughly 40% of the
claimants have no lawyer and in temporary disability cases, 95% of
the injured workers are unrepresented.3 79 Because of the danger
of overreaching by the carrier, some states require that all settle-
ments be approved by the referee or some other official.3 80 This
supervision, however, is often superficial, leaving the uninformed
employee at the mercy of the carrier's representative.3 8 1
That most cases are either settled by the parties or resolved at
the first hearing level does not mean that injured employees receive
monetary benefits quickly. In uncontested disability cases, it takes
an average of nearly six weeks from the start of lost work time until
the employee receives the first check, and in uncontested death
cases it takes an average of four and a half months. In contested
disability cases it takes an average of more than five months before
the employee receives the first check, and in contested death
benefits it takes an average of about eighteen months.
3 8 2
These averages, however, conceal the delay which characterize
many cases. If the case is not settled and goes to hearing, the delay
in payment in disability cases averages more than fourteen
months.3 8 3 In cases where the issue is whether the injury is work-
related, the delay is substantially longer.
3 84
The crucial importance of delay is that in most states the injured
employee receives nothing until there is a settlement or award. The
378 See Sincere, supra note 368, at 1088 & n.50.
379 See Bernstein, supra note 372, at 124. Some states allow persons other than
lawyers to represent claimants. See e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, § 7(c) (Supp. 1992)
("Any party... may be represented by an attorney or by any other person designated
by such party."). Only approximately one percent of representation, however, is done
by non-lawyers. See Bernstein, supra note 372, at 124.
380 See, e.g., Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 103-04 ("The appropriate and
legitimate way of resolving disagreements between the claimant and the carrier is by
providing a prompt hearing... .").
381 See Sincere, supra note 368, at 1085 (describing how, in Illinois, carriers'
attorneys have "dominated the [settlement] procedure"); see also STATE PROFILES,
supra note 370, at 1-414 (detailing each state's procedures for supervision of
settlements).
382 See Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 57.
383 See id. at 58. In Illinois, a claim is scheduled for first hearing about three
months after it is filed, but this is only a "status" call, and there is an automatic
continuance of three or four months. There are often additional continuances, which
are granted routinely. Once the hearing is completed, it is three or four months
before a decision is issued. Nearly 10% of the cases take more than three years to be
resolved. See Sincere, supra note 368, at 1086, 1092-94.
3" See Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 59.
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delay in obtaining a hearing is used to pressure the employee, with
mounting medical bills and no income, to settle for substantially less
than the full value of the claim. s8 5 There is some evidence that
carriers contest cases and carry them to hearing for the purpose of
exerting this pressure.
3 8 6
The principle weakness of workers' compensation remedies is
the inadequacy of benefits for lost wages. Typically, weekly benefits
for the period the employee is disabled are computed at two-thirds
of the injured employee's prior average wage, with a maximum
weekly benefit based on the state's average weekly wage.3 8 7 Only
two-thirds of the wage loss are paid to discourage malingering and
encourage the injured employee to return to employment.
3 8 8
This reduction in wages, of course, penalizes those who are
genuinely unable to return to work. Scheduled benefits pay a fixed
number of lost work weeks in cases of dismemberment, such as loss
of a finger, hand, foot, or leg, regardless of actual wage loss. In
some cases these payments are grossly unfair because the dismem-
berment may totally incapacitate the person for her occupation.
Once the predetermined number of benefit weeks expire, the
worker is without any income.3 8 9 In addition, the maximum
weekly benefit is most commonly fixed at 100% of the statewide
average wage, with the result that those earning higher wages or
salaries will receive less than two-thirds of their wage loss.
390
385 See STATE OF NEW YORK, FINAL REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND DISABILITY BENEFITS 46, 109 (1986) (stating that due
to desperation, claimants often accept lump-sum settlements which range from one-
half to one-fourth of the present value of their expected benefits ) [hereinafter NEW
YORK FINAL REPORT]; see also Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 99, 103.
86 See NEW YORK FINAL REPORT, supra note 385, at 69 n.62 (stating that only 38%
of carriers' appeals on the issues of "classification, extent and period of disability"
were at all successful).
387 See 1990 ANALYSIS, supra note 364, at 18-21. The employee's wages do not
include fringe benefits paid by the employer, which may be more than 25% of
earnings. Particularly serious is the loss of pension payments, health care, and social
security. See Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 75-76.
388 See Monroe Berkowitz, Workmen's Compensation Income and Benefits: Their
Adequacy &' Equity, in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 189, 191 (1973).
389 The number of weeks of benefits for the loss of a hand is the same for a
secretary, a janitor and a lawyer; the number of weeks' benefits for loss of a first
finger on the left hand is the same for a violinist, a bank clerk and a truck driver; and
the benefits for loss of a leg is the same for an artist as it is for a professional athlete.
See BERKowrrz & BURTON, supra note 371, at 110 (listing the predetermined number
of benefit weeks for various injuries, regardless of ability to return to work after
benefits expire).
390 This may be partially offset because compensation benefits are not taxable
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Most seriously, particularly for the long term or permanently
disabled, is that the weekly benefits are determined as of the time
of injury. Most states make no provision for changes in wage loss
due to inflation or the employee's normal lifetime earnings curve.
As a result, the benefit for those with permanent disabilities may,
after several years, be only a fraction of their actual wage loss.
3 91
The injured employee's right to rehabilitative treatment, where
it exists, has limited value. Lawyers often advise employees not to
accept rehabilitation until their case is settled because it may reduce
the amount of the settlement-and the amount of the lawyer's
fee.3 92 Carriers do not encourage rehabilitation because their
dominant incentive is to settle the case and avoid future responsibil-
ity for rehabilitation and its administrative costs.39g  Obviously,
delay in starting rehabilitation significantly reduces the likelihood
of its success. Rehabilitation services are generally insufficient,
screening procedures to identify employees who would benefit are
inadequate, employees are not informed of their options, and delays
from administrative procedures and waiting lists further discourage
injured employees. As a result, the number of those enrolled is a
small percentage of those in need of rehabilitation.
3 94
The adequacy of the employee's remedy is further reduced by
the need to pay lawyers' fees.3 95 As originally conceived, the
compensation agency was to be the active guardian of the employ-
ee's right, making it unnecessary for a claimant to be represented
by counsel.3 96 This, however, has proven to be a naive hope. The
procedure as it has developed is adversarial because of the employ-
ers' and carriers' desire to reduce costs by contesting claims. For
this reason and because of time pressures, hearing officers cannot
simultaneously represent the claimant and judge the merits of the
case.3 97  Employees cannot effectively represent themselves in
income. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (1988).
391 For a discussion of the adequacy of benefits, see Conley & Noble, supra note
365, at 63-79. Death benefits only replace 36% of the lost income for the surviving
spouse. See William G.Johnson & Edward Heler, CompensationforDeathfrom Asbestos,
37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 529, 532 (1984).
392 See Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 86-87.
393 See id.
394 See generally id. at 81-88.
S9 A few states require the employer or its carrier to pay the employee's
attorneys' fees, but in most states the employee must pay her own lawyer. See
Bernstein, supra note 372, at 133-34.
s9 See id. at 121 ("[T]he Workers' Compensation hearing officer was to be the
claimant's protector (perhaps advocate) as well as impartial arbiter of his claim.").
197 See id. (noting that various pressures preclude a hearing officer from
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contested cases because the legal doctrines, the problems of proof,
and the procedure have become complex. This leaves claimants
with no real option but to employ counsel. Indeed, lawyers not
familiar with the specialized practice have difficulty representing a
claimant effectively,3 98 and the practice is limited to a relatively
small club of lawyers who specialize full time in representing injured
employees in compensation proceedings.
3 99
Attorneys' fees are controlled either by statute or by the agency.
The fees allowed are relatively low with the typical amount being
20% to 25% for the first $5000, and a smaller percentage for larger
amounts, based on the value of the whole cash award, excluding
medical costs.400 Attorneys appear in only 5% of the temporary
disability cases, at least in part because the small awards cannot
produce an adequate fee. 40 1 Even in permanent disability and
death cases, in which awards are more substantial, the fee is
relatively small. One consequence is that lawyers must handle a
large number of cases with relatively little time devoted to each.
Lawyers may handle ten to twenty cases in a single day, often not
securing photographic evidence, arranging for medical testimony or
rehearsing the claimant's testimony.40 2  Flat percentage fees
encourage lawyers to settle for a lump sum in order to minimize
their efforts and obtain early payment.403 Although attorneys'
fees are relatively low-too low to reward high quality legal effort-
payment of these fees by the injured claimant significantly reduces
the already inadequate recovery. The two-thirds recovery of wage
loss is reduced to a net of little more than one-half of the actual
wage loss.
All of the inadequacies of workers' compensation remedies are
magnified in occupational disease cases.40 4 In these cases the
undertaking the multiple functions originally intended).
398 See id. at 123-26 (noting that "great familiarity with a large and intricate set of
agency and court-constructed precedent and the procedures of medical institutions,
insurers and agencies are required for competent representation").
399 See Sincere, supra note 368, at 1089 (describing the Illinois workers' compensa-
tion bar as a "fraternity").
400 See Bernstein, supra note 372, at 137.
401 See id. at 142 (noting the difficulty claimants encounter'when attempting to
retain counsel for smaller claims).
402 See id. at 127.
403 NEW YORK FINAL REPORT, supra note 385, at 47; See Conley & Noble, supra
note 365, at 105.
404 See generally Bernstein, supra note 372, at 144-45 (noting "the difficulty of
ascribing causation to a particular employer"); Note, Compensating Victims of
Occupational Disease, 93 HARv. L. REv. 916, 921-25 (1980) (noting that problems of
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proof problems are much more difficult due to the need to show
the specific source of the disease at the workplace and to show the
employee's exposure within time limits frequently specified by the
statute. A high percentage of these cases are contested-as many as
88% for dust-related diseases and 86% for repeated trauma injuries
such as hearing loss.40 5 The high rate of contested cases results




Although the employees' remedies under workers' compensation
have obvious weaknesses, they are in some respects better than the
remedies for other employee rights which have been discussed.
Delay in recovery is painful, but a delay of six weeks in uncontested
cases, and five months in contested cases with fourteen months for
a decision after a hearing outpaces the NLRB, puts the EEOC to
shame and leaves the unjust discharge cases in the starting gate.
The burden of attorneys' fees, which are avoided in the NLRB and
shifted in the EEOC and Wage-Hour cases, are substantially less
than the contingent fee agreements in wrongful discharge cases. An
injured employee has far less difficulty obtaining a lawyer or
proceeding pro se than an employee who is victimized by discrimi-
nation or underpayment and is not dependent on an agency's
general counsel to support the claim. Although the legal service
obtained is not high quality, it may be adequate in most cases.
Studies show that in contested cases, claims were denied in less than
4% of the cases, modified in less than 20% and settled by agreement
in over 60%.407 Overall, despite delays and inadequacies, most
employees who had meritorious claims received some monetary
award.
Another positive aspect of workers' compensation is that it is
constructed so as to encourage employers to reduce the number of
accidents. Except for employers with less than four employees, the
employer's insurance rates are generally merit rated, scaled
according to the claims paid.408 The cost of accidents is thus
largely internalized, pressuring the employer to take whatever safety
proving "that the resulting injury arose out of employment ... pose an immense
challenge").
405 See Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 110-11.
406 The average delay from the filing of a claim to the first payment was 390 days,
as compared with 43 days for the typical accident claim. See Note, supra note 404, at
923.
407 See Conley & Noble, supra note 365, at 100.
408 See id. at 134-36. Ninety percent of all premiums are experience rated. See id.
at 135-36.
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measures will cost less than the accidents they will avoid.4°
Although there is debate about whether this insurance rating
scheme provides a sufficiently substantial incentive,41 ° it does
provide a much greater economic incentive for safety efforts than
the limited and random fines of OSHA.
Compared with the other procedures which have been discussed,
workers' compensation has significantly lower transaction costs. A
much larger portion of money paid out by the responsible employer
reaches the injured employee. In 1987, the national ratio of
benefits paid per $1 of employer cost was 69 cents,4 11 and that
figure was the lowest in five years. 4 12 From this figure must be
deducted the employees' lawyers' fees, which on the average for all
workers' compensation claims, amounts to less than 4% of bene-
fits. 4 13  The result is that the employee nets between 65% and
409 Premiums charged do not exactly parallel benefits paid. A portion is reserved
to insure against large losses and a portion is allocated for administrative expenses.
Furthermore, the merit rating formula gives greater weight to the number of claims
than the amount of the benefits. See generally Richard B. Victor, Experience Ratingand
Workplace Safety, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQUITY, AND
EFFICIENCY 71, 72 (John D. Worrall & David Appel eds., 1985) (discussing the
financial incentives in workers' compensation for employers to prevent injuries and
diseases).410 See, e.g., James R. Chelius, The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety
Incentives, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 235, 241 (1982) (discussing the "dysfunctional
impact" of increased injuries that arguably results from workers' compensation);
William S. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in the
Post-Regulatoiy Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence Employer
Decisions to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REv. 9, 21-25 (1989) ("The
empirical findings comparing wage-risk differentials and workers' compensation
incentives are mixed at best."); John D. Worrall & Richard J. Butler, Labor Market
Theory and the Distribution of Workers' Compensation Losses, in WORKER's COMPENSATION
INSURANCE PRICING 19, 19 (David Appel & Phillip S. Borba eds., 1988) (describing a
statistical study of"how changes in the benefit structure... and in experience rating
affect claims").
411 See WilliamJ. Nelson, Jr., Workers' Compensation: Coverage Benefits and Costs,
1987, SOC. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1990, at 2, 7.
412 The loss ratio (the proportion of the premium dollar returned to the injured
worker in the form of cash payments and medical services) in 1984 was 73% and in
1985, 72%. WilliamJ. Nelson,Jr., Workers' Compensation: Coverage Benefits and Costs,
1985, SoC. SEC. BULL.,Jan. 1988, at 4, 9. The national loss ratio includes insurance
obtained through private carriers, state and federal programs, and self-insurance. See
id. The loss ratio for state funds is much higher. In 1985, for example, the loss ratio
for eighteen state funds was 91%. See id.
413 The average legal fee award in New York in 1982 was $445, and the total
awarded was 3% of the total compensation. See New York Workers' Compensation
Bd., Compensation Cases Closed, 1982, in RESEARCH AND STATISTICS BULLETIN 1, 13
(1982). In Michigan, legal fees amounted to 4% of the total cost of the system. See
Bernstein, supra note 372, at 138.
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70% of the premiums paid by the employer. This should be
compared with the 30% received by the median employee in
wrongful discharge cases.414 Although no hard data is available
for the Wage-Hour and EEOC cases, the costs of litigation com-
pared to the amounts received by the employee 415 are more
similar to those in the wrongful discharge cases, further highlighting
workers' compensation's relative advantage.
IV. COLLECTIVE CONTRACT REMEDIES
The nearly universally accepted procedure for adjudicating and
enforcing rights under collective agreements is the union grievance
procedure, with ultimate resort to arbitration. 416 This procedure
is used for enforcing not only the collective or institutional rights
of the union, but the whole range of contractual rights of individual
employees, including claims of unjust discharge, claims for wages,
vacation and holiday pay, and complaints about working conditions,
sick leave, health and welfare benefits, promotions, transfers, and
layoffs.
417
From the standpoint of the individual employee, the grievance-
arbitration procedure has marked advantages. First, the individual
bears none of the costs; her union dues provide what amounts to
group legal services for contractual rights. The union provides the
cost of advocacy at both the grievance and arbitration level, whether
by union representative or a lawyer, along with the share of
arbitration costs and fees. In addition, the union collects the
necessary evidence, obtains the needed witnesses, and takes
whatever steps are necessary to enforce a favorable award. The
lowest wage and least capable employees are thus protected.
Second, arbitration is relatively prompt. The average time
between the filing of a grievance and the issuing of an award is
414 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
415 The public costs of administration is relatively small, apparently between 1%
and 3% of the benefits paid. Some states assess insurers a percentage of premiums,
for instance, 2% in Florida. States levying assessments have nearly doubled the
resources for administration. See Milton Brooke, Administering Workmen's Compensa-
tion Cases in California, Florida, Massachusetts, NewJersey, New York, and Wisconsin, in
3 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAws 77, 92 (Monroe Berkowitz ed., 1973).
416 See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:5 (Jan. 23, 1992)
("Arbitration is called for in 99 percent of the sample contracts .. ").
4 17 See 43 FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV. ANN. REP. 44 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter FMCS RELEASE].
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about eleven months.4 18 Although occasional cases may drag out
for more than a year, some collective agreements provide for
expedited procedures, particularly for certain kinds of cases.
4 19
Both the anthracite and bituminous coal agreements require
discharge cases to be heard by the arbitrator and decided within
fifteen days. 420 Finality is seldom delayed by appeal of the arbi-
trator's award, for the number of awards appealed to the courts is
less than .5%.421 When awards are appealed, the median time for
a court decision is one year.
422
One disadvantage to the individual employee of the grievance-
arbitration procedure is that it is controlled by the union, and the
individual is bound by the union's decision not to arbitrate, if that
decision is made fairly and in good faith.423 The union may, of
course, have limited resources so that not all meritorious claims can
be carried to arbitration. Most unions, however, feel morally and
politically obligated to carry all substantial cases to arbitration.
They give priority to the point of impoverishment to contest unjust
dismissals and substantial discipline, often following the policy of
carrying any discharge case to arbitration if the employee requests.
From the standpoint of both the union and the employer, the
grievance-arbitration procedure has additional values. First, it
provides a structured negotiation process which encourages early
418 See id. at 43. The average time between the date the grievance is filed and an
arbitration panel is requested is 95 days, and the time between a request for a panel
and the issuance of an award averages 231 days. Id. The American Arbitration
Association statistics for 1990 show an average of 266 days from the time a panel is
requested to when an award is issued. See Labor Cases Awarded 1990, STUDY TIME, No.
4, 1991, at 2.
419 See Cornelius J. Peck, Report on a Survey of Academy Members on Expedited
Arbitration, in ARBrTRATION 1985: LAW AND PRAcTICE 265, 270 (WalterJ. Gershen-
feld ed., 1986) (finding that approximately 66% of expedited cases were mandated by
the collective bargaining agreement).
420 See Anthracite Wage Agreement of 1990 art. 19, § (c); National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1988 art. XXIV § (d) (requiring arbitration hearing and
decision within five days, with the arbitrator issuing a written opinion not more than
ten days later).
421 In 1987, there were an estimated 78 district court decisions involving an
appealed award and nearly 10,000 awards issued under Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) and American Arbitration Association (AAA) auspices.
Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts:
Facts and Figures, ARB.J., Mar. 1990, at 41.
422 See id. at 45-46.
423 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967) ("[W]e do not agree that the
individual employee has an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration
regardless of the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.").
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investigation of the facts and maximizes the chance of settlement
before any litigation begins.424  Discharges may be reduced to
short term suspensions and lesser disciplinary penalties may be
mitigated. Even minor actions such as warning notices may be
considered and adjusted, while other claims may be resolved or
compromised. However, the demand for arbitration does not end
the negotiation process. Less than 20% of the cases in which
arbitration is requested proceed to an award; over 80% are resolved
prior to a hearing.
425
Second, the arbitration procedure is simple and inexpensive.
There are no formal pleadings, no discovery or depositions, no
motions for summary judgement, no post trial motions, few
subpoenas, and no technical rules of evidence. The issue is
addressed directly in an informal hearing, which only occasionally
lasts more than one day.426 The procedure does not require a
lawyer, and can instead be competently handled by a union
representative or a personnel officer. Lawyers, however, are
increasingly used by both employers and unions.
427
The inclusion of lawyers, with their habits and practices, adds
substantially to the costs and delays of arbitration, with doubtful
improvement in the process. An empirical study suggests that if
only one party is represented by a lawyer, the likelihood of that
party's success increases, but if both parties are represented, the
likelihood of one party winning is the same as if neither party were
represented. 428 The study recommends that the parties could
424 At General Motors in the 1950s only 4% of 10,800 grievances reached
arbitration. Gabriel N. Alexander, Impartial Umpireships: The General Motors-UAW
Experience, in ARBrrRATION AND THE LAw 108, 129 (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1959). The
experience at Chrysler was much the same. See David A. Wolff et al., The Chrysler-
UAW Umpire System, in THE ARBrrRATOR AND THE PARTIES 111, 117 (Jean T. McKelvey
ed., 1959) (averaging less than 23 decisions per year from 1943 through 1957).
425 In 1990, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service received 27,363
requests for arbitrations but only 5275 awards were issued. See FMCS RELEASE, supra
note 417, at 43-45. In 1989, there were 27,213 requests and 3769 awards. See id.
426 See id. at 43 (average hearing time 1.11 days in 1990).
427 In 1984, employers used lawyers in nearly three-fourths of cases, and unions
used lawyers in one-half of the cases. See Richard N. Block &Jack Stieber, The Impact
of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543, 543
(1987). In 1991, employers used lawyers in 83.2% of cases and unions used lawyers
in 59.0% of cases. American Arbitration Association Reports. on Labor Arbitrations,
PERSONNEL PRAcs. NEWSL. (Townley & Updike, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1992, at 15
[hereinafter, AAA on Labor Arbitration].
428 See Block & Stieber, supra note 427, at 554.
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save money by both parties agreeing not to use lawyers. 42 Using
court reporters and filing post-hearing briefs430 also add to the
cost with little value added in most cases. 431 Delay is substantially
increased by the need to find a hearing date mutually acceptable to
the lawyers as well as the parties and the arbitrator, and post-
hearing briefs may add about two months to the time needed to
obtain an award.43 2
The costs of arbitration, even when lawyers are used, are only a
fraction of the costs of either judicial or administrative procedures,
even though the parties rather than the public pays for the cost of
the tribunal. The tribunal costs shared by the parties, which include
the arbitrator's fee, travel expenses and other costs, are generally
between $1400 to $1800. 433 The lawyer's fees are much less than
in other procedures, because the arbitration is unencumbered by
pre- and post-trial processes and motions. Using hourly rates, union
lawyers report fees in a discharge case ranging from $2500 to
$5000.434 This compares with their fees in an NLRB proceeding
for discriminatory discharge of roughly double the amount for
arbitration, and in an employment at will case or a Title VII case
which goes to trial of $50,000 to $75,000. 43- Employer lawyers'
fees, though 50% to 100% higher than those of union lawyers, show
much the same pattern of relative costs of the different proce-
429 See id.
430 Transcripts are taken in one-third of the cases and briefs are filed in three-
fourths of the cases. See FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ARBITRATION
STATISTICS FISCAL YEAR 1989, at 4 [hereinafter FMCS STATIsTICs]. In American
Arbitration Association cases, transcripts are made only in one-fourth of cases, and
briefs filed in only two-thirds of cases. See AAA on Labor Arbitration, supra note 427,
at 15.
431 See Daniel F. Jennings & A. Dale Allen, Jr., Labor Arbitration Costs and Case
Loads: A Longitudinal Analysis, 41 LAB. LJ. 80, 85 (1990). Twenty-nine percent of
arbitrators would eliminate court reporters, 63% would eliminate post-hearing briefs,
and only 3% would eliminate attorneys. Eleven percent preferred to hear cases
presented by non-lawyer representatives while 30% preferred lawyers and 58% percent
thought it made no difference. See id.
432 See FMCS STATISTICS, supra note 430, at 1. The average time between the
hearing and the date of an arbitrator's award in 1990 was 64.87 days. FMCS RELEASE,
supra note 417, at 43.
433 In 1990, for a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service arbitrator, the
average fees were $1612.56, expenses were $208.04, for an average total of $1820.60.
See FMCS RELEASE, supra note 417, at 43. American Arbitration Association figures
for 1991 show an average per diem fee of $465 with an average fee of $1764 and total
cost of $1901. See Labor Case Distribution and Fees in 1990, STuDY TIME, 1991, No. 4,
at 2.
14 These estimates are based on my conversations with practitioners.
4ss See supra note 434.
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dures.
43 6
The remedies available to arbitrators are, in principle, nearly
unlimited, for the courts have stated that in the absence of
contractual limitations, arbitrators have broad discretion in
designing the remedy.4 7 In practice, however, the remedies are
quite limited, seldom going beyond specific future performance of
the contractual obligation and compensating employees for any loss
of earnings or benefits.48 In wrongful discharge cases, reinstate-




Reinstatement substitutes for potential loss of future earnings, and
in most cases is an effective remedy because the union is present to
protect the employee in the future. Studies show that a majority of
those who return to work under an arbitrator reinstatement order
remain and become satisfactory employees.440 Employees who
are reluctant to return to work, whether because of employer
hostility or because they have found another job, may use the
reinstatement order to negotiate a "buy-out" with the employer.
Arbitration remedies, limited to specific performance and lost
wages, are often incomplete. An employee who is subjected to
racial or sexual harassment receives no compensation; the employer
is simply told to put an end to the practice. Similarly, an employee
ordered to do work outside her classification or work she believes
436 No systematic study of lawyers' fees for arbitration cases is available. The
approximate figures used here are based on figures provided to me by a limited
number of lawyers regularly involved in representing parties in arbitration.
437 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960) (holding that arbitrator has need for flexibility in formulating remedy).
4
38 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 288 (4th
ed. 1985) (recognizing difference between possession of power and occasion for its
use).
439 See id. at 688; see generally David E. Feller, Remedies in Arbitration: Old Problems
Revisited, in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, at 109, 110 (1982) (espousing view
that arbitrators are "contract readers" and not "contract enforcers"); Anthony V.
Sinicropi, Remedies: Another View of New and Old Problems in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR
THE 1980s, supra, at 134 (cataloguing how arbitrators have decided the issue of
remedies in a variety of situations).440 See Thomas J. McDermott & Thomas H. Newhams, Discharge-Reinstatement:
What Happens Thereafter, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 526, 533-37 (1971) (finding that
more than 50% of reinstated employees rated at least satisfactory on a five point
scale); Arthur M. Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: What Happens. After
Reinstatement, in CRICAL ISSUES IN LABOR ARBrrRATION 21, 24 (Jean T. McKelvey
ed., 1957) (discussing divergent but untested theories regarding the likely success of
the subsequent career of a reinstated employee); but see West, supra note 31, at 30
(finding that only 21% of those actually reinstated remained on the job two years
after reinstatement). The experience in NLRB reinstatement cases is quite the
opposite. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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dangerous may be obligated to obey on pain of discipline, but will
recover no damages. An employee wrongfully discharged recovers
nothing for losses suffered as a result of being without income
pending arbitration, such as repossession of his car, dispossession
from his apartment, or foreclosure on his mortgage. Nor is there
any recovery for the emotional trauma which commonly results
from job loss, and which is particularly severe when the discharge
carries an unjust accusation of wrongdoing or poor performance.
Whatever may be the inadequacy of arbitration remedies, these
have been widely accepted by unions. Although unions at times
complain about arbitration awards which only tell the employer not
to do it again, they have not articulated substantial protests against
the limited remedy for unjust discharge. Nor have arbitrators
seriously questioned the adequacy of the customary remedies. An
explanation may be that the continuous policing of the employer's
actions and the ready availability of remedial action reduce the need
for deterrent remedies and make the incomplete remedies accept-
able.
V. SUMMARY
In examining the effectiveness of various remedies in protecting
certain employment rights of individuals, I have made no attempt
to catalogue all of the available remedies for protecting such rights.
Job security is protected by a scatter-shot of other state and federal
remedies which protect "whistleblowers," prohibit discrimination
based on race, sex, creed, nationality, age, disability, political
beliefs, and sexual preference, regulate plant closings, and statutori-
ly proscribe unjust discharge. 44 1  Protection against
undercompensation may be available under the Walsh-Healey,
442
Davis-Bacon, 443 and Service Contract Acts, 444 state minimum
wage laws and wage payment statutes, and remedies for failure to
pay severance pay, medical benefits and pensions provided under
ERISA. 445 Protection of physical integrity may also derive from
criminal sanctions or third party tort actions against suppliers of
defective equipment or dangerous substances. The purpose of this
441" For a survey of state and federal workplace rights, see Rabin, supra note 28,
at 174-87.
442 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1988).
413 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)
444 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1988).
44- 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
article has not been to measure how well the interests of individual
employees are protected, but only to understand more clearly how
effective particular remedies are in protecting these substantive
employment rights.
One major weakness in protecting many substantive rights has
not been extensively discussed, but is antecedent to the effectiveness
of the remedies. Employees are often unaware of their substantive
rights, and therefore do not seek remedies. They do not recognize
that their rights to the minimum wage or required overtime pay
have been violated by improper deductions from their pay or
incorrect methods of calculating the hours worked. Employees do
not recognize violations of the OSH Act because past experiences
condition them to expect dangerous practices, unguarded machines,
irritating chemicals and poor ventilation as a part of the job.
Employees suffering from hearing loss because of deafening noise
on the job, carpal tunnel syndrome because of repetitive motions,
or heart attacks because of strain or tension from their work, may
be unaware that they may be entitled to workers' compensation.
This weakness is not equally troublesome for all substantive
rights. Few victims of overt discrimination are unaware of the
remedies under Title VII or the ADEA. They may, however, be
unaware that the sexual or racial harassment endemic in their
workplace is illegal, or that manipulation of pension rights may
constitute age discrimination. Many employees protesting, or
wanting to protest, working conditions or abusive supervision in a
non-union setting do not know that two or three employees acting
together constitute protected concerted activity under the
NLRA.446 Because employees often do not know their rights,
employers may ignore or deny them, and the employees may fail to
assert or enforce them.
VI. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR REMEDIES
The jumble of procedures and remedies for individual employ-
ment rights lacks any coherent pattern. The diversity is not entirely
a function of the different substantive rights protected. Remedies
for discrimination in employment differ without defensible reason.
A discharged union member must persuade the General Counsel of
4 46 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962).
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the NLRB to issue a complaint,447 but a discharged woman may
sue even though the EEOC concludes that her discrimination claim
is groundless. 448  The difference is not grounded in the rights
protected, but is caused by historical sequence. The NLRB
procedure which denied the employee control over enforcing her
rights had proven itself unsatisfactory and was deliberately rejected
when the Civil Rights Act was amended in 1972. Although
recognized as unsatisfactory for more than twenty years, the NLRB
procedure remains unchanged.449
Prior to 1991, all discrimination cases under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were triable before a judge,450 but dis-
crimination cases under the ADEA are tried before a jury.
451
Rule 23 class actions may be brought under Title VII, but not under
the ADEA.452 These distinctions arose because administration of
the ADEA was originally placed in the Department of Labor, not the
EEOC, and FLSA procedures were made applicable.45 Adminis-
trative responsibility was later moved to the EEOC, but the FLSA
procedures were perpetuated.454 Retaliatory discharge victims
may receive, under common law remedies, damages not only for
lost earnings, but also for emotional distress and punitive damages
as well.455 Until 1991, sex discrimination victims received only
lost earnings. 456 Work injury victims can recover only medical costs
and two-thirds of lost earnings from their employers. 457 Finally,
victims of OSHA violations cannot even sue.458 This is the diver-
447 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
448 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
449 See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 139 (1975) (noting that the
"practical effect of [the] administrative scheme is that a... victim of an unfair labor
practice can obtain neither adjudication nor remedy.., without first persuading the
Office of the General Counsel that his claim is sufficiently meritorious to warrant
Board consideration").
450 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988).
451 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988). Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, any party
may demand a jury trial if the complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages beyond back pay. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(c), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981(a)(c) (West Supp. 1992). But no compensatory or punitive can be awarded in
disparate impact cases under § 105 so no jury trial is available in such cases. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (West Supp. 1992).
452 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988).
453 See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
454 See Marion, supra note 188, at 302-03.
455 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
456 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
457 See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
458 See supra text accompanying notes 279-85, 289-94.
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sity and irrationality of the remedies for only the few employment
rights examined here.
Despite the jumble of procedures and remedies, it is possible to
project some guidelines which have general applicability if individu-
al employment rights are to be effectively enforced. Special
tailoring, of course, is needed to fit the remedies to the particular
substantive rights protected, but the commonality of the underlying
problems points to some basic principles.
First, and fundamentally, employees who believe that their rights
have been violated should be able to initiate and press their claims
through all procedural steps, including the final appeal. Employ-
ment rights should be conceived of as rights belonging to the
individual employee, and no agency or official should be able to
foreclose the employee from obtaining a hearing and adjudication
of those rights.
The official or agency, for political or other reasons, may have
limited concern or commitment to enforcing the rights, or may lack
the vision or aggressiveness to elaborate the particular rights
claimed by employees. The NLRB procedure allows the General
Counsel to refuse to issue a complaint and blocks an employee from
obtaining a determination of her right by either the Board or a
court. 459 As a result, for twenty years employees victimized by
racial discrimination could not obtain protection from such conduct
because the General Counsel would not issue complaints in such
cases.460 When the issue finally came before the Board, it was
held to be an unfair labor practice.461 Until recently, workers
suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome or put at risk by video
display terminals have received little or no protection from
OSHA.46 2 Courts of appeal have had to order OSHA to adopt
adequate standards warning employees of hazardous substances and
other matters,463 and puny fines reduced the effectiveness of
inadequate inspections. 464 A major weakness of the OSH Act is that
459 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
460 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
461 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
462 See H. Vincent McKnight,Jr., Biomechanics of VDT Carpal Tunnel Cases, TRIAL,
June 1991, at 50, 52 ("OSHA has not yet devised guidelines for the safe use of
VDTs.").
463 See, e.g., National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 858 F.2d 1019, 1035 (5th Cir.
1988) (noting that substantial evidence did not justify OSHA's refusal to adopt a
standard requiringgrain elevator operators to initiate dean-up procedures whenever
grain dust accumulations reached a certain depth).
46 See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
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endangered employees must look to the agency for protection and
cannot proceed on their own to enforce their statutory rights.
465
This weakness of public enforcement is aggravated when agencies
whose statutory responsibility is to protect employee rights are
politicized and staffed with appointees who do not believe in those
rights or who are more committed to deregulation than to the
purpose of the statute.
More importantly, placing sole responsibility on a public agency
to protect employee rights holds those rights hostage to budget
restrictions. Effective protection can be eviscerated by reducing the
funds available for enforcement, a decision of low political visibility.
In the last ten years, employee rights have been effectively denied
by the unfocused and disassociated policy of "no new taxes."
OSHA's severe underfunding, allocated only enough to inspect each
establishment once every seventy-five years, 466 should be an ample
object lesson. The EEOC's unanswered pleas for more funds to
enable it to conduct needed investigations and bring enforcement
suits4 6 7 and the lack of Wage-Hour Division resources to proceed
against sweatshops468 also demonstrate dramatically the depen-
dence of employee rights on budget decisions. Our political
institutions are much more willing to declare employee rights than
they are to provide the funds needed to protect those rights. So
long as that is the case, the employees must be able to assert those
rights and have them adjudicated without depending on a public
agency for enforcement.
The argument is not that enforcement of employment rights
should be completely privatized. There is a proper place and, in
some instances, a need for public enforcement. Enforcement of
certain rights may have broad social purposes beyond the protection
of the individual employee. Title VII and FLSA suggest the
possibilities of allowing both public and private enforcement. The
agency can require record keeping and reporting, and make
investigations which will not only disclose violations, but also will
help employee plaintiffs prove violations. The agency can bring
enforcement actions to fulfill the public interest and aid the
employees in bringing suit, but employees should not be foreclosed
from enforcing their individual rights by the agency's failure or
465 See supra notes 279-85, 289-94 and accompanying text.
466 See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
467 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
468 See supra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
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refusal to act.
Second, if reliance is placed on private enforcement, it becomes
crucial to ensure that litigation costs do not preclude employees
from pressing their claims. The employment at will cases demon-
strate that if the injured employee must pay the costs of court
litigation, only those in the upper income brackets with large claims
and substantial likelihood of success will obtain a lawyer to press
their claims.46 9 A contingent fee will not compensate the lawyer
for her time unless the claim is potentially large and lawyers will
normally require at least advance payment of out-of-pocket
costs. 470 Provisions in Title VII and the FLSA for payment of
attorneys' fees to winning plaintiffs provide a partial solution, but
only in cases with a substantial likelihood of success. 471 Even in
those cases, legal costs are a troublesome impediment and the out-
of-pocket costs may be too large for the injured plaintiff to advance.
Also, a lawyer with limited resources may not be able to forego
current income and invest the hours needed, particularly in
complicated cases, with the prospect of payment only if successful
and at the end of extended litigation.
All of this points toward the third guideline: the need for
simplified procedures which reduce litigation costs, particularly legal
fees. This is not possible in court procedures, which have become
encumbered with elaborated pleadings, discovery, depositions, an
arsenal of pre-trial memoranda, post-trial briefs and a plethora of
other pre- and post-trial proceedings. Employers may deliberately
exploit these court procedures in order to discourage employees
with limited resources who need prompt relief. Legal costs and
delays can be reduced only by using less formal administrative
procedures such as those used in workers' compensation proceed-
ings or before the NLRB. The costs of these less formal procedures
constitute only a fraction of the costs of judicial proceedings,
primarily because they dispense with many of the pre- and post-
hearing practices.4 72 Costs are reduced even further in labor
arbitration, particularly when lawyers are not involved and tran-
469 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
470 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
471 See supra notes 167-84, 259-65 and accompanying text.
472 Legal fees for workers compensation cases amounted to only about 3% of
benefits for workers in Wisconsin, 12% in Florida, and 6% in California. BERKowrrz
& BURTON, supra note 371, at 381. This is far less than the one-third or 40%
contingent fees in unjust discharge cases. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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scripts and briefs are waived. 473
Informal and simple procedures may provide less refined justice.
Some facts may not get discovered or fully explored; some legal
arguments may not be as fully developed or understood; and the
decisions may not be as carefully considered or articulated. Because
the procedure is less formal and elaborate, there is less willingness
to place large amounts at risk, so recoveries for emotional distress
must be limited and punitive damages excluded.474  The
employee's remedy, therefore, may be less. A balance, however,
must be struck between more perfect outcomes and larger recover-
ies for a few on the one hand, and affordable costs with more
limited damages to many on the other. Where the employment
rights of individual workers with limited resources are involved, the
balance tips heavily on the side of affordable costs and smaller
recoveries. More perfect decision-making ought not to be bought
by depriving most employees of any decision at all.
Fourth, employees seeking to assert their employment rights
must be guaranteed protection from employer retaliation. The
NLRA, Title VII, ADEA, FLSA and OSHA all have anti-retaliation
provisions, 475 but the procedures and remedies for retaliation
have the same weaknesses as those for other violations. An
employee who is discharged because she blows the whistle on safety
or health violations cannot bring suit on her own, but must rely on
the Solicitor of Labor, who insists she does not have funds to bring
suit in more than a small number of such cases.476 A wage-hour
whistleblower may obtain reinstatement, back pay, liquidated
damages and attorneys' fees, 477 if she can find a lawyer to take the
case. An employee who is discharged for objecting to an employer's
unfair labor practice can file a charge against the employer, but he
will have to depend on the General Counsel to file a complaint.
478
Some workers' compensation statutes have anti-retaliation provi-
sions,479 but some do not, and not all state courts have held that
473 See supra text accompanying notes 428-32.
474 See supra notes 438-40 and accompanying text.
475 NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1988); FLSA § 216(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3); ADEA § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); OSHA § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c); Title
VII § 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
476 See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
477 See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1988); see also supra notes 257-69 and accompanying text.
478 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
479 See e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, § 75B(2) (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 418.301(11) (1985).
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discharges for filing a workers' compensation claim are void as
contrary to public policy.480  "Whistleblower" statutes, on both
the federal and state level, are perforated with loopholes and have
proven notoriously ineffective.
481
Employer retaliation against employees who assert their
employment rights should be treated as more than an injury to the
employee; it is an offense against the law itself. Punitive damages
are particularly appropriate. The employer should be punished
both for the purpose of deterrence and for vindication of the law.
The employee should recover more than actual damages as a reward
for putting himself at risk and as an encouragement to other fearful
employees to assert their legal rights.
Fifth, the remedy must contain a visible and substantial element
of deterrence. No procedures can be devised which can or will
reach all potential violations. There are too many employees and
too many workplaces. Too many employers are indifferent or
resistant to recognizing various employee rights, and too many
employees are uninformed of their rights or reluctant to assert
them. To achieve any deterrence, the employer must lose, rather
than gain, when it violates those rights. Many employers will, of
course, obey the law out of a sense of social and moral obligation,
but without a deterrent factor they will be placed at a competitive
disadvantage by those who value profits over good citizenship.
Most present remedies provide little or no deterrence. NLRB
cease and desist orders do no more than warn the employer not to
repeat the violation. An order of back pay to a discriminatorily
discharged employee provides some deterrence, for the employer
obtains no production for the wages paid, but this cost may be little
to pay for discouraging unionization. Back pay awards for FLSA
violations carry no sting without the assessment of additional
liquidated damages. Citations for health and safety violations and
orders to abate create little incentive to provide a safe and healthful
workplace, for the fines assessed often cost less than the gain
480 See e.g., Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978) (holding generally that
an employment at will contract may be terminated by either party without cause or
justification, even if the discharge is malicious); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Co., 364 So. 2d
89 (Fla. 1978) (refusing to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge where
an employee was allegedly terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim and
employment arrangement was terminable at will).
481 See, e.g., SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 10, §§ 10.01-.22 (discussing federal
statutory anti-retaliation and wrongful dismissal regulation); Dworkin & Near, supra
note 18, at 260-64 (discussing state statutes); supra note 17.
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realized from violations before the inspection.48 2  Inadequate
workmen's compensation awards, with the employee bearing a
substantial portion of the loss, result in employers not measuring
the full economic cost of the injury against the cost of safety
measures to avoid the injury. This reduces the number of situations
in which the employer's calculus determines that safety pays.
Perhaps the greatest deterrence in all employment cases is the
employer's legal costs in defending against claims of violation, but
these are imposed whether or not the employer has committed a
violation.
Although a deterrence factor is essential to providing employers
with an incentive to recognize employment rights, relying too
heavily on deterrence can be self-defeating. Burdensome penalties
tend to discredit the remedy and reduce the willingness of a court
or administrative agency to find a violation of substantive rights.
The California experience in employment at will cases warns that
large recoveries for emotional distress and punitive damages may
lead to shrinking or abolishing substantive rights. 83 Fines for
safety and health violations which are too large will lead employers
to contest citations and appeal decisions with such frequency that
enforcement procedures will become delayed and clogged.
Deterrence is better achieved by increasing the percentage of
violators held liable than by increasing the penalty on a few unlucky
ones brought to book. How much deterrence is enough but not too
much also depends on the substantive rights protected, the
willingness of employers to recognize those rights, the seriousness
of the violations, and numerous other factors. The problem is too
complex to do more than identify it here.
Sixth, the remedy must be economically efficient. In employ-
ment at will cases, less than one third of the money paid out by
employers sued for wrongful discharge ends up with the wronged
employee. 48 4 The transaction costs of attorney fees and expenses
absorb more than two thirds of employer payments, and this does
not count the burden on the taxpayer of providing courts to decide
the disputes. Judicial remedies under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
FLSA have similar transaction costs resulting from enforcement
through court litigation. The disproportionate transaction costs
cannot be justified except on the basis of providing a substantial
4
82 See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
4s1 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
484 See supra notes 44-76 and accompanying text.
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deterrence factor.
High transactions costs again stress the need for simplified
procedures, and emphasize the special value of labor arbitration.
The litigation costs for arbitration under collective agreements are
only about one-tenth of the litigation costs for judicial proceedings,
and the parties rather than the taxpayer bear the cost of the
tribunal.
Finally, judicial and administrative procedures ought not
supplant grievance and arbitration proceedings in protecting
contract rights under collective agreements. Grievance arbitration
has proven itself acceptable to both unions and employers, and
except in rare cases, is far preferable to other procedures available
to individual employees. The contract procedures should be given
first opportunity to determine and protect individual employment
rights. Although these procedures can finally determine only
contract rights, they may make unnecessary or discourage pursuit
by the employee of common law or statutory rights.
Unions, as representatives of the employees may, and as
Professor Rabin has persuasively argued,485 should aid employees
in enforcing these common law and statutory rights in the adminis-
trative and judicial forums. A majority union may appropriately
bargain for the grievance and arbitration procedures to be available
for adjudicating those rights and encourage employees to use those
procedures rather than resort to litigation. The union ought not,
however, be able to preclude individual employees, without their
consent, from pursuing their common law and statutory rights in
the legally designated administrative and judicial forums.
These guidelines cannot, of course, all be fully achieved
simultaneously. Individual employees cannot control enforcement
of their rights and not bear some of the enforcement costs.
Simplified and inexpensive procedures, necessary to reduce the
employee's enforcement cost, reduce the deterrent effect provided
by the employer's legal costs. Procedures which are economically
efficient will likely leave a wronged employee less than fully
compensated and employers less than fully deterred. In balancing
these competing concerns, the most important consideration is
devising a combination which will maximize the number of wronged
employees who will seek to enforce their rights and increase the
number of violations remedied. Although the remedy may be less
48 See Rabin, supra note 28, at 242-54.
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than fully adequate in individual cases, more employees will obtain
a vindication of the rights, with some measure of recovery, and
employers will be deterred by the greater likelihood of liability.
VII. PROPOSALS BEYOND THE GUIDELINES
The preceding discussion has pointed out specific defects in the
procedures and remedies for protecting a limited number of
employment rights. The purpose has not been to make a compre-
hensive or detailed analysis, but rather to identify those aspects
which limit or frustrate effective protection of employment rights.
From this examination of procedures and remedies, certain
guidelines evolve which suggest, directly or indirectly, some specific
changes. No attempt has been made, however, to elaborate the
guidelines or to work out all of their implications for each of the
employment rights, although some are self evident. Such detailed
development is beyond the reach of this Article.
The guidelines, however, point more generally toward the need
for certain institutional and structural changes which will make
protection of these rights more effective. First, although employ-
ment rights are individual rights enforceable by the individual, it is
quite evident that those rights cannot be adequately enforced by
individual employees acting alone. Even if the guidelines are
followed, too many employees will not know their rights or will be
reluctant to assert them alone for fear of retaliation. Even if an
employee knows and asserts her rights, the voice of a lonely
individual is often too weak to command the employer's attention
short of a summons and complaint, and legal action will too
seldomly motivate an employer to make a serious effort to settle
short of an impending trial. In addition, the cost for each separate
individual to obtain a determination of his rights by a separate legal
process is discouragingly burdensome even with the simplest
procedure of arbitration.
486
The experience with class actions in Title VII suggests the
potential value of employees acting as a group to enforce their
individual legal rights.487 The need is to create devices beyond
the class action which will enable employees to act together to
protect their individual legal rights. The most obvious device is a
union. Where the union is the majority representative, it can
486 SeeJennings & Allen, supra note 431, at 88.
487 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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reinforce many of the common law and statutory rights by contrac-
tual provisions, and enforce those contract rights through the
grievance procedure and arbitration. Collective agreement
provisions against discrimination can provide more prompt and
effective remedies than Title VII; seniority clauses make the ADEA
protection against discharge unnecessary; and the "just cause" clause
provides more protection than the expensive and long odds of an
employment at will suit.
48 8
Common law and statutory rights need not be mirrored in the
collective agreement, for, as Professor Rabin has demonstrated,
489
the grievance and arbitration procedure can be enlarged to
adjudicate and enforce these rights directly. Although the majority
union could not assert its exclusive representation status in
enforcing these rights, the individual's consent after the dispute
arises to submit the dispute to arbitration would make the award
final and binding.490  Such an extension of the grievance and
arbitration procedure would seem to be a mandatory subject of
bargaining which might be demanded by either the union or the
employer, and would seem to be to the advantage of both.
Unfortunately, this solution has limited potential, for less than 15%
of employees in the private sector are covered by collective
agreements and have the grievance procedure and arbitration
available to them.
Even where a union does not have a majority, it can help
employees enforce their legal rights by informing them of their
rights, collecting evidence, acting as spokesperson in discussions
with the employer, providing legal assistance, and even striking in
protest of a discharge, discrimination or unsafe working condi-
tions.491 Unfortunately, few unions provide such assistance where
they are not the majority representative.
492
In the majority of workplaces, the need remains to provide some
institutional structure through which employees can act collectively
in protecting their legal rights. Provisions of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act suggest a starting place. Section 8 provides:
"' See supra notes 416-26 and accompanying text.
489 See Rabin, supra note 28, at 248-49.
490 See id. at 257-58.
491 For the potential role of a non-majority union, see Clyde Summers, Unions
Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CH.-KENT L. REV. 531, 534 (1990) (outlining the
ways in which a non-majority union can "represent and serve the interests of workers
in the workplace").
492 See id. at 533-34.
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"a representative authorized by his employees" shall be allowed to
accompany an inspector in his walk around the plant,493 "employ-
ees or their representative" must have an opportunity to observe
monitoring for toxic chemicals, 49 4 a "representative of employees"
who believes a violation threatens physical harm or imminent
danger may request an inspector and trigger a special inspec-
tion,495 prior to or during an inspection a "representative of
employees" may notify the inspector of any violation which is
believed to exist,496 and the employee representative is entitled
to a review if the Secretary refuses to issue a citation.4 97 Under
section 10, a "representative of employees" may contest the length
of time given an employer to abate a violation,498 and under
section 11, may obtain judicial review not only of this issue but any
decision of the Commission. 499 Under section 13, a "representa-
tive of employees" who are subject to an imminent danger, which
could reasonably be expected to cause death before it could be
eliminated through enforcement procedures, can sue for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Secretary to seek an injunction.
500
These provisions hang in the air where there is no union to act
as representative, for the Secretary of Labor has not adopted any
regulations for determining who is to act as "representative of
employees" in the absence of a union.501 What is obviously
needed is a method for employees to select such a representative in
workplaces which have no union. Statutory amendments could
provide that in each workplace a safety representative or committee
should be elected by the employees, at the request of any employee,
with authority to act as their representative under the statute. That
authority should not be exclusive, so as not to foreclose individuals
or groups of employees from acting on their own, but the safety
493 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1988).
494 Id. § 657(c)(3).
495 Id. § 657(f)(1).
496 Id. § 657(f)(2).
497 See id. § 657(0(2).
498 Id. § 659(c).
499 See id. § 660(a); see also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v.
OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting § 660(a) as granting "the
union ... a right to appeal the decision of the [Commission]").
500 29 U.S.C. § 662(d).
501 The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission has defined an
"authorized employee representative" as "a labor organization that has a collective
bargaining relationship with the cited employer and that represents affected
employees." 29 C.F.R. § 2200 .1(g) (1991).
REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
representative or committee could act on the request of an
employee or on its own.
The functions of such statutory safety committees should not be
confined to the narrow observer and appeal roles presently given to
"representatives of employees." Nor should such committees be
relegated to the consultative role common for voluntary safety
committees.50 2 Statutory safety committees should be viewed as
the workplace implementors of the statutory provisions and policies,
representing the interests of employees, individually and as a group,
in having a safe and healthy workplace.
Elementary functions would include the right to inspect
regularly and in detail all activities and conditions of the workplace
as well as the employer's records of accidents and occupational
diseases and the right to be informed, in advance, of proposed use
of toxic materials and the introduction of new machines or
processes which would create new risks to health and safety. When
the statutory representative found conditions which he believed
needed correction, he should have the obligation and the right to
discuss the matter with management. Where management's
response was considered inadequate, the safety committee should
be able to call for an inspection. The safety committee could
thereby provide an on-going process of inspection more effective
than any array of government inspectors could provide. The safety
committee should have the same right as the employer to appeal to
the Commission from the action or inaction of the Secretary and to
obtain judicial review of the Commission's order, and it should have
the same standing as the employer in all rule-making and enforce-
ment procedures.
For a statutory committee to perform these functions effectively,
the members must be trained so they will recognize safety and
health risks and statutory violations. This requires substantial and
continuous training.
50 3
The multiple functions of safety committees and the need for
training raise the question of who should bear the costs. Because
these committees would serve, in effect, as substitutes for govern-
502 See Rabin, supra note 28, at 191-92 ("Worker representatives also could play
a part in voluntary programs of compliance under OSHA and in facilitating binding
settlements of OSHA complaints.").
503 For a statement of what is needed for an effective safety committee in a union
context, see BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IN
SAFEGUARDING WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH 41 (1989).
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ment inspectors, the cost might be considered the cost of enforce-
ment and be borne by the government. But the responsibility of
maintaining a safe and healthful workplace rests on the employer
and reducing employee injuries and correcting violations prior to
inspection citations also serves the employer's interest. The cost
might, therefore, appropriately be placed on the employer. Clearly,
however, the cost should not be placed on the employees any more
than the employees should be required to provide for their own
safety equipment. The committee must also be paid for the time
needed to do its job. No employee can be expected to lose work
time and earnings to aid the employer in protecting the health and
safety of other employees. Again, the question is who is to bear the
costs, the employer or the government. There is no need to
elaborate the arguments here, but an appropriate allocation would
be for the government to bear the costs of education and training,
and the employer to bear the cost of lost working time.
The suggestion made here to create statutory safety committees
elected by the employees, is neither novel nor remarkable. All of
the Western European countries and Canada have such commit-
tees. 50 4 Even Britain, which historically has emphasized voluntar-
ism in legislation, provides by statute for the establishment of safety
representatives and committees50 5 where there is a bargaining
relationship, defining their powers and function. Provisions for
training and paid time to carry out the work are accepted as
essential, and in some countries such as France 50 6 and
Sweden 50 7 the safety committees have much broader functions
and greater authority than sketched here.
The proposed Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health
Reform Act, introduced in the Senate in 1991 includes provisions
requiring establishment of safety and health committees by all
employers of eleven or more employees. 508 Employee representa-
tives on the committee are to be elected by the employees, and the
committee is to have wide authority to make inspections, investigate
work accidents, illnesses, and complaints, review injury and illness
04 SeeJulie E. Korostoff et al., Rethinking the OSHA Approach to Workplace Safety:
A Look at Worker Participation in the Enforcement of Safety Regulations in Sweden, France,
and Great Britain, 13 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 45 (1991) (comparing and contrasting the roles
of safety committees in Sweden, France, and Great Britain).
505 See id. at 85-88.
506 See id. at 65-78.
507 See id. at 52-56.
508 See S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. tit. IT (1991).
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records, make recommendations for improvement of health and
safety, and accompany compliance officers in the walkaround on
paid time.5°9 Education and training of members of the commit-
tee is largely to be paid for by the government.51 The proposal
does not meet all the needs considered above, but it takes a long
step in mandatory election of employee safety representatives.
511
Such employee committees need not be limited to enforcing
employee rights to health and safety, but could help enforce other
employee rights. They are especially appropriate for implementing
OSHA, for unsafe or unhealthy conditions endanger all employees,
even if only random individuals suffer actual injury. Similar
committees would be equally appropriate for enforcing employee
rights under the FLSA where many employees may be subject to the
same violation, but employees may not know their rights or be
fearful of enforcing them. Workplace committees would be
especially useful in advising injured employees as to workmen's
compensation claims and helping them file and process their claims.
The committees might serve a similar function for unemployment
compensation claims.
Although unjustified dismissals are essentially individual,
arbitrary action toward one employee may disclose an employer's
attitude which threatens others and creates general insecurity. A
dismissed employee could look to a committee for advice and aid in
considering legal action. Such committees could be equally useful
in helping individual employees know and enforce a wide range of
their common law and statutory employment rights ranging from
the rights of privacy to rights to pensions under ERISA.
What is being suggested is the possibility of creating employee
legal rights committees at the workplace which would enable
employees to act as a group to enforce their common individual
legal rights. These committees would help overcome the advantage
that the employer has because of its dominant authority in the
workplace, its greater knowledge, larger resources, and its role as a
50 See id.
510 See id. § 27 (c), tit. VII.
511 An Oregon statute empowers the Director of Oregon OSHA to require an
employer with 10 or more employees to establish a safety committee under certain
circumstances. See OR. REV. STAT. § 654.176 (1989). Both the Senate proposal and
the Oregon statute provide that the committee have an equal number of employer
and employee representatives. See id. § 654.182(1); S. 1622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 28(b)(2) (1991). Neither make clear whether or when the employee representatives
could act alone in requesting inspections, contesting citations, or appealing orders.
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repeat player in the enforcement process. Perhaps most important-
ly, such committees would provide a structure for negotiating with
the employer to settle such claims before they got into the hands of
lawyers, and to channel the unsettled claims into arbitration. They
would, thereby, serve the long run interests of both the employer
and its employees, as well as the social interest in quick and
inexpensive resolution of disputes without burdening the legal
system.
Such committees should not, of course, have an exclusive right
to enforce common law and statutory rights. Individual employees
should retain full freedom to proceed on their own to seek help
from other sources. For example, employees discriminated against
based on of race, sex, age, disability, or union membership might
sometimes find workplace committees unhelpful, but they would
still be able to seek the help of others in the same group or
organizations dedicated to protecting their special interests. The
workplace committee would simply be available for those needing
and seeking help.
Expanding the function of workplace committees to protecting
legal rights beyond safety and health raises problems of who should
pay the costs of such committees. If one accepts the principle that
the costs of winning plaintiffs should be paid by the employer, then
a substantial portion of the costs could be properly assessed against
the employer.512  A portion, however, should be paid by the
employees, both to give the employees more sense that the process
belongs to them, and to provide an incentive not to overuse the
process. The division of the cost might be fixed in various ways,
such as each side paying a percentage, requiring the employer to
pay a fixed amount with the employees paying the rest, or requiring
the employer to match the amount paid by the employees.
Employees might each be assessed a certain amount per month or
year, voluntarily subscribe to participate and pay a share, or be
assessed for claims processed. There is no time nor need to work
out here the advantages and disadvantages of the various means of
financing. It is enough to say that the financing problem, though
difficult, is not an insuperable obstacle to creating such legal rights
512 Payments by the employer to such committees would presently be barred by
§ 302(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1988).
Employer payments to a labor organization for workmen's compensation cases,
however, are presently allowed. See id. § 186(c)(5). This exception could be enlarged
to cover other employment rights cases.
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committees.
513
It must be emphasized that legal rights committees would not be
engaged in collective bargaining to create contractual rights, but
would be engaged only in enforcing existing common law and
statutory rights. They would in no way displace unions or collective
bargaining. Rather, they would be established only to aid employees
not represented by unions-to help secure the legal rights of the
85% of the workforce which is not protected by recognized unions.
CONCLUSION
The present wave of increased judicial and legislative protection
of employee rights in the workplace, like the earlier wave of
legislative protection of collective action, explicitly rejects the
economic theory that all terms and conditions of employment
should be regulated solely by individual bargaining in a free market.
Regardless of whether such a market is economically efficient or
subject to disabling market failures, it has results which have been
judged to be socially and politically intolerable. As a political
society, we have held fast to the conviction that individual employ-
ees need protection from market forces.
For nearly half a century, heavy reliance was placed on collective
bargaining in a free collective market to protect employees, but that
proved inadequate. Although highly effective in protecting rights
under the collective contract, collective bargaining sometimes failed
to protect the rights of minorities and did not reach rights outside
the scope of the contract. Most important, collective bargaining has
presently left the vast majority of private employees subject to
individual bargaining and its unacceptable results. The response,
not surprisingly, has been legally to declare, either by judicial
decision or legislation, certain basic employment rights.
The problem of what rights to declare is matched, if not
surpassed, by the problem of how to provide remedies which will
make those rights real. The present study, although focusing on a
limited number of legally protected rights, makes clear that existing
remedies for employment rights are seriously lacking, and in some
cases distressingly meaningless. Three points of weakness stand out.
First, employees cannot rely on government agencies to enforce
their rights. Government agencies are too often hobbled by budget
51 For a discussion of various methods of funding the protection of the legal
rights of employees, See Rabin, supra note 28, at 211-13.
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limitations and too vulnerable to political appointees who are
unsympathetic to the substantive rights meant to be protected.
Second, judicial procedures are too cumbersome and expensive to
enforce the rights of ordinary workers. Courts are affordable only
to the elite, and even in those cases the lawyers go home with most
of the money. Third, individual employees, acting alone, lack the
information, resources, and psychological support to readily assert
their rights against employers who dominate their work life. These
factors lead almost inescapably to the need to create workplace
structures through which employees can act collectively in protect-
ing their legal rights, and which can provide a negotiating forum
with ultimate resort to an arbitration process similar to that
provided by collective agreements.
Legal protection of substantive employment rights enforced
through such a collective structure falls far short of providing
employees protection equivalent to collective bargaining. Legal
protection will not reach many rights which can be protected by
collective agreements, but will be limited primarily to the more
basic employee rights. Also, the in-plant committees proposed here
will not have the economic, organizational or financial resources of
unions in asserting and enforcing those rights.
Nor can such committees fulfill the Wagner Act's promise of
giving employees a measure of industrial democracy, with some
voice in the decisions of the enterprise and the operations of the
workplace. Legal rights committees can, at most, assure employees
that they will enjoy the benefit of decisions made through the
political processes. In order for employees who do not have
collective bargaining to have any meaningful voice in daily decisions
which shape and control their working lives, in-plant committees
must have much broader functions, and responsibilities, greater
resources, and more substantial organizational structure. Professor
Weiler has persuasively developed the case for such committees, and
has begun the process of exploring the problems as to their
structures, responsibilities and functions.514 Legal rights commit-
tees might provide some experience about how employee participa-
tion committees might be structured and coordinated with collective
bargaining. They will in no way satisfy the greater need for
providing employees with a measure of industrial democracy.
514 See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 283-306 (1990) (arguing for
employee participation committees and exploring their structure and functions,
relationships to unions, and implementation).
